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A DISSENT FROM THE MIRANDA DISSENTS: 
SOME COMMENTS ON THE "NEW" FIFTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE OLD 
"VOLUNTARINESS" TEST 
Yale Kamisar* 
The world and the books are so accustomed to use, and over-use, 
the word "new" in connection with our country, that we early get 
and permanently retain the impression that there is nothing old 
about it.-Mark Twain (1883)1 
[F]or the very reason that those in authority have no right to re-
quire a disclosure, those without authority feel justified in seeking 
to worm it out by threats, by fraud, by holding out false hopes, by 
putting forward false pretenses ... Unwilling to allow a magistrate 
to institute, as a matter of course, a formal examination, and place 
the result on record, we leave the same information to be fished for 
by the sheriff who makes the arrest, by the jailer, by the fellow-
prisoner turned informer or by the detective in disguise, and only 
require the witness who proves it to add perhaps perjury to fraud 
in swearing that no undue means were used to elicit the confes-
sion.-Sirneon E. Baldwin (1883)2 
I F the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch con-versations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I 
have participated this past summer3 are any indication, Miranda v. 
Arizona4 has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among 
judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such 
reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and 
relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
The author is indebted to Steven Brodsky, a second-year student at the University 
of Michigan Law School, for his valuable research assistance. 
1. MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI ch. I (1883). 
2. Simeon E. Baldwin, Paper Read at Sixth Annual Meeting of the American 
Bar Association, printed in 6 A.B.A. REP. 225, 232 (1883). 
3. For example, on the basis of four lively workshop sessions, lasting three full 
hours, with the Chief Justices of the States at the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the 
Conference of Chief Justices, August 5, 1966, I would have to say they were over-
whelmingly opposed to the recent confession rulings. 
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Warren, C.J.). Actually, "the Miranda opinion" is an 
opinion for four cases: Miranda, No. 759; Vignera v. New York, No. 760; Westover 
v. United States, No. 761; and California v. Stewart, No. 584. Justices Harlan, Stewart 
and White dissented in all four cases, joining in separate dissenting opinions written 
by Justices Harlan and White. Justice Clark, who would continue to follow the 
"totality of circumstances" rule but assign increased weight to whether the appro-
priate warnings were given, see 384 U.S. at 499, 503, 504, dissented in three of the 
four cases but concurred in the result in California v. Stewart "if the merits are 
to be reached," id. at 504. (He preferred to dismiss the writ of certiorari in Stewart 
for want of a final judgment.) 
281 
282 POLICE PRACTICES AND THE LAW 
period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important 
that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions 
do not escape attention. 
I must agree with Justice Harlan that "the fine points of this 
[the Miranda majority's] scheme are far less clear than the Court 
admits,'' 5 but I mean to treat this in another article. I do not deny 
that some aspects of the majority opinion are questionable, for 
example its defining "custodial questioning" 6-which must be 
preceded by warning the suspect that "he has a right to remain si-
lent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed"7-to include stopping and ques-
tioning on the street.8 I take it, however, that one may sharply dis-
5. 384 U.S. at 505. A number of questions about the reach of Miranda are raised 
in HALL & KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 450 (2d ed. 1966). 
6. See note 43 infra and accompanying text. 
7. 384 U.S. at 444. This appears in the self-styled summary of the Court's holding. 
The warnings (and the reasons for them) are discussed in considerable detail at 
pp. 467-79 of the majority opinion. 
8. Thus, although, as Judge Breitel had pointed out on the eve of Miranda, the 
controversy had centered on what rights the suspect enjoyed and what rights he was 
entitled to after he was brought to the police station, Breitel, Criminal Law and 
Criminal justice, 1966 UTAH L. REv. l, 8-9, the Court manifested its willingness to 
enter a thicket "largely ignored by commentators and dealt with ambiguously by 
most courts." Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Question-
ing and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, in 
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 11, 15 (Sowle ed. 1962). 
The Court has had much experience with police station interrogation (if any-
thing, too much), but so far as I know it has never had occasion to consider the 
admissibility of a statement produced by "on the street" or "on the spot" questioning. 
I am convinced that the persistent, resourceful, skillful police interrogator is no 
bogyman, b11t he operates within the confines of the stationhouse, not on the streets 
or even in the squad car. The average patrolman is of a different breed. I am readily 
persuaded by what the Court has to say about the substantial pressures generated 
by the isolation, secrecy and unfamiliarity of the "interrogation room," but the 
Court has virtually nothing to say about the inherently compulsive and menacing 
nature of "on the street" questioning. 
I agree that the privilege protects an individual from being compelled to in-
criminate himself even though the compulsion be "informal" and "subtle" and that 
the privilege "does not distinguish degrees of incrimination," 384 U.S. at 476-once 
a certain degree is reached. Distinguishing degrees, after all, is inherent in the process 
of defining "compel" within the meaning of the privilege. That the requisite degree 
will sometimes be reached in the course of "field interrogation" I have no doubt. 
But always? Necessarily? Typically? Of course any questioning by a police officer 
anywhere generates some pressures and anxieties-"what on their face are merely 
words of request take on color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor." 
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, in 
POLICE PowER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 29, 30 (Sowle ed. 1962). This is also true, 
however, of "general on-the-scene questioning" and of police visits at a suspect's home 
or place of business, situations where, the Court tells us, the requisite warnings need 
not (or, at least, need not always) be given, because "the compelling atmosphere 
inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present." 
384 U.S. at 478. 
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sent from portions of the Miranda dissents without warmly endors-
ing every aspect of the majority opinion. I take it that here, as 
elsewhere, one may spot the bad without committing himself to, 
or knowing, the perfectly good.9 
Dissenting Justice Harlan, joined by Justices White and Stewart, 
utters a couple of "hurrahs" for the old test-"a workable and ef-
fective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial manner"10 
and "an elaborate, sophisticated and sensitive approach to admissi-
bility of confessions."11 The aim of the majority, he protests, "is 
Finally, if the police must issue the Miranda warnings to one detained "on the 
spot," they are more likely to resort to the more drastic alternative of taking him 
down to the stationhouse. A stop may well be an "arrest" for some purposes, but it 
does not stigmatize a man the way a formal "arrest" for a felony does. 
On the other hand, this is surely one of those "damned if it did" (cover field 
interrogation) and "damned if it didn't" issues which sometimes confront the Court. 
As the Court must have been well aware, confining the Miranda rules to station-
house proceedings-which would have sufficed to dispose of all the cases before it-
would have put enormous pressure on the police to intensify and widen the less 
visible "on the street" detention and to slow down or make more circuitous the 
ride to headquarters. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 5.01, com-
ment at 174 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 
HARV. L. REv. 935, 945 (1966). By defining "custodial questioning" to cover "field" 
and "squad car" questioning, the Court was understandably reaching out (albeit 
most gingerly) to protect its flanks. For drama and glamor it is hard to beat the 
"interrogation room" confession, but the "more humdrum" common practice of 
stopping and questioning raises "far more basic" issues. See Packer, Who Can Police 
the Police?, The New York Review of Books, Sept. 8, 1966, pp. 10, 12. 
True, the Court might have taken a "middle ground" on this troublesome cluster 
of issues and indicated that whether questioning of a person "deprived of his free-
dom in any significant way" is to be preceded by the requisite warnings should turn 
on the particular circumstances attending each incident, but to do so might have 
largely defeated its central purpose, which was to displace the unsatisfactory case-
by-case approach in this field with a set of firm, specific, "automatic" guidelines. 
(The effects of its apparent exceptions for "general on-the-scene questioning" and 
police visits at a suspect's home remain to be seen.) 
If the distinctions between "field interrogation" and "police station" questioning 
are without a difference for purposes of the requisite warnings, are they nevertheless 
significant for purposes of "waiver"? Is the "heavy burden" resting on the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, 
384 US. at 475, appreciably lighter outside the relatively controlled environment of 
the stationhouse? Considering the greater confusion and higher incidence of "emer-
gency situations" on the street, the substantially greater pressures usually operating 
in the police station, and the much more extensive means of corroborating evidence 
of warnings available there, much can be said for an affirmative answer. However, 
I do not find the answer in Miranda. Although I doubt that all those reading the 
Miranda opinion with a magnifying glass can be restrained from expounding in the 
meantime, this aspect of Miranda, above all others, will be brought into focus only 
by "new prodding of the new facts." Cf. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
293 (1960). 
9. Cf. FULLER, THE MORAUTY OF LAW 11-12 (1964). 
10. 384 U.S. at 506. 
11. Id. at 508. Justice Clark, too, although he maintains that "the majority .•• 
goes too far on too little, while my dissenting brethren do not go quite far enough," 
id. at 499, retains considerable enthusiasm for the old approach: 
Rather than employing the arbitrary Fifth Amendment rule which the Court 
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toward 'voluntariness' in a utopian sense."12 I submit that it is the 
dissenters who are the dreamers, not the majority. I venture to say 
that only one with an extravagant faith in the actual operation of 
the "totality of the circumstances" test could fail to see that the 
safeguards provided by the old test were largely "illusory."18 Justice 
Harlan is distressed that the majority requires the police to show 
"voluntariness with a vengeance,"14 but I submit that, as his vote 
to uphold the confession in Davis v. North Carolina15 well illus-
trates, he would require the defendant to establish restraint, coer-
cion and a breaking of the will "with a vengeance." 
A victim of objectionable interrogation practices could only 
satisfy this test with some regularity in a utopian judicial world. 
This was not Davis' world. He could produce a specific notation on 
the arrest sheet to the effect that he was to be held incommunicado. 
He could also point to the undisputed fact that no one other than 
the police had seen him during the sixteen days of detention and 
interrogation that preceded his confessions. Moreover, on the basis 
of these confessions he was sentenced to death, which however pain-
ful otherwise, does not "hurt" one who is seeking to gain close ap-
pellate court scrutiny and reversal. Nevertheless, Davis lost in the 
state courts and, on habeas corpus, in the two lower federal courts.16 
True, Davis is only one case, but most alleged victims of impermis-
sible police interrogation enter the "swearing contest" with many 
fewer weapons. 
The dissenters are startled at how the majority manages to leap 
over high historical and linguistic barriers to bring the privilege 
against self-incrimination into the interrogation room. "A trompe 
l'oeil,"17 proclaims Justice Harlan. "At odds with American and 
English legal history,"18 reports Justice White, joined by Justices 
lays down I would follow the more pliable dictates of the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which we are accustomed to ad-
ministering and which we know from our cases are effective instruments in 
protecting persons in police custody. 
ld. at 503. 
12. 384 U.S. at 505. 
13. A close student of the problem so characterized them a full twenty years ago, 
pointing to the almost insurmountable problems of proof confronting the alleged 
victim of improper interrogation practices. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 708 (1946). 
14. 384 U.S. at 505. 
15. 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (on federal habeas corpus). Since, in another case handed 
down the same day, the Court declined to give the new rules retroactive effect, 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), it applied the traditional confession rules 
to strike down the Davis confessions, Justices Clark and Harlan dissenting. 
16. See the discussion at notes 164-82 infra. 
17. 384 U.S. at 510. 
18. Id. at 531. 
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Harlan and Stewart. "Decisions like these," warns Justice White, 
"canno~ rest alone on syllogism, metaphysics or some ill-defined 
notions of natural justice."19 
Miranda may leave something to be desired, but it deserves a 
better reception than this. True, it amounts to a substantial jump 
from Escobedo,'Ji) which,-in tum, marked a jump from Haynes.21 
But Miranda is hardly a thunderbolt from the blue. It is unques-
tionably a sharp departure from the recent past, but if one travels 
back far enough-"Oh, no!" many a reader will exclaim at this 
point. "Not another 'we but return to old principle' discourse."22 I 
sympathize with these readers. ' 
Police-prosecution-minded critics of the courts can be exasperat-
ing; at least -.:hey have often exasperated me.23 But champions of 
liberty and privacy can also be exasperating; at least they have even 
exasperated me. Every year I teach Adamson v. California,24 and 
though I never fail to pummel the majority opinion, I never fail 
to gag at Justice Murphy's dissent: "Much can be said pro and con 
as to the desirability of allowing comment on the failure of the ac-
cused to testify. But policy arguments are to no avail in the face 
of a clear constitutional command."25 I joined in the general re-
joicing when Gideon v. Wainwright26 was ·handed down, but I 
winced at Justice Black's assertion that "the Court in Betts v. Brady 
made an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents"27 
and at his assurance that "in returning to these old precedents 
... we but restore constitutional principles .... "28 
I am well aware that for what I am about to say I, too, shall 
be accused of finding refuge in constitutional language whose spec-
ificity and immutability is largely illusory, of "returning" to a 
mythical past, or at least of being less impressed with historical facts 
which do not fit my theories than with those which do. I adhere 
19. Id. at 5!11-32. 
20. 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
21. !173 U.S. 503 (1963). But this was not nearly as long a jump as the many who 
were thunderstruck by Escobedo seemed to think. See Herman, The Supreme Court 
and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO STATE L.J. 449, 454-56 (1964). 
22. See generally Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, in 1963 
SUPREME COURT REviEW 2ll, 234-42 (Kurland ed.). 
23. See, e.g., Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of 
the Courts, 49 CoRNELL L.Q. 436 passim (1964). 
24. 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964). 
25. 332 U.S. at 125. Eighteen years later the Court did vindicate Justice Murphy's 
position, although it was not content to rest on a "plain reading" of the Constitution. 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (Douglas, J.). 
26. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
27. Id. at 344. 
28. Ibid. 
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to the view that whether or not the Court's reading of the privilege 
against self-incrimination in Malloy v. Hogan29 "makes good sense, 
... it constitutes bad history-modern history, that is."30 I still 
maintain that although "the old Bram case might well have fur-
nished a steppingstone to the standard advanced in Malloy, . . . 
until Escobedo, at any rate, it only amounted to an early excursion 
from the prevailing multifactor approach."31 I claim only this: 
(I) The linguistic and historical barriers, whatever they were, 
which lay in the path of Miranda's application of the privilege to 
"custodial questioning" were considerably less formidable than those 
surmounted when the privilege was applied to legislative investiga-
tions and civil proceedings. Yet long before Brown v. Mississippi,82 
the Court's first fourteenth amendment due process confession case, 
it was settled, rightly or wrongly, that the privilege did apply to 
these latter proceedings. Given Counselman v. Hitchcock33 and 
McCarthy v. Arndstein,34 Miranda appears to be an a fortiori case; 
29. 378 U.S. I (1964). 
30. Kamisar, Equal justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal 
Procedure, in CRIMINAL JusTICE IN OUR TIME 47 (Howard ed. 1965). 
31. Ibid. The reference is to Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
32. 297 u.s. 278 (1936). 
33. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The Court held that appellant need not answer questions 
asked in a grand jury investigation which would tend to incriminate him because the 
"protection of § 860 [of the Revised Statutes] is not coextensive with the constitu· 
tiona! provision." ld. at 565. The statute protected appellant against direct use of 
his testimony in a criminal proceeding, but "could not, and would not, prevent 
the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against 
him .... " Id. at 564. Appellee argued that: 
An investigation before a grand jury is in no sense "a criminal case." The 
inquiry is for the purpose of finding whether a crime has been committed and 
whether any one shall be accused of an offense. The inquiry is secret; there is 
no accuser, no parties, plaintiff or defendant. The whole proceeding is ex parte. 
Id. at 554. The Court retorted that: 
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only 
be, that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a 
criminal prosecution against himself .... The object was to insure that a person 
should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give 
testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. 
The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief 
against which it seeks to guard. 
!d. at 562. 
In Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) and Quinn v. United States, 349 
U.S. 155 (1955), the privilege against self-incrimination was successfully invoked by 
petitioners who refused to answer certain questions asked of them by the Committee 
on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. Members of the Court 
differed only as to whether petitioners had properly claimed the privilege for them-
selves; not even the dissenting justices I paused to consider whether a congressional 
investigation is "a criminal case." 
34. 266 U.S. 34 (1924). Rejecting the government's broad contention that the 
privilege "does not apply in any civil proceeding," id. at 40, as well as its narrow 
contention that the privilege "does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give 
information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate," id. at 41, a 
unanimous Court observed, per Justice Brandeis: 
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that is, unless one is prepared to rekindle the Twining-Adamson-
Malloy debate. 
(2) The prize for ingenuity goes not to the Supreme Court for 
finally applying the privilege to the police station but to those who 
managed to devise rationales for excluding it from the stationhouse 
all these years. Dwell for a moment on the reasoning that because 
police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any 
kind, there is nothing to counteract, there is no legal obligation to 
which a privilege can apply, and hence the police can elicit state-
ments from suspects who are likely to assume or be led to believe 
that there are legal (or extralegal) sanctions for contumacy. 311 Is it 
unduly harsh to say, as those who do not use strong words lightly 
have, that such reasoning is "casuistic"36-"a quibble"?37 
(3) Assuming a "first amendment privilege" which would re-
lieve the fifth amendment of its burden in "belief probes,"38 most, 
if not all, that can be said for the privilege applies in spades to 
police interrogation. One would do well to start with what Professor 
John McNaughton, no warm friend of the privilege, concluded 
some six years ago after a painstaking analysis of the problem: 
The significant purposes of the privilege remaining after the First 
Amendment albatross has been cut free ... are two: [I] The first 
is to remove the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances 
where compulsion might lead to inhumanity, the principal in-
humanity being abusive tactics by a zealous questioner. [2] The 
second is to comply with the prevailing ethic that the individual 
is sovereign and that proper rules of battle between government 
and individual require that the individual not be bothered for less 
than good reason and not be conscripted by his opponents to defeat 
himself. 
Both policies of the privilege which I accept, as well as most of 
those which I reject, apply with full force to insure that police 
in informal interrogations not have the right to compel self-in-
criminatory answers. Whether the result is reached by pointing 
The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding 
in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and 
criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal 
responsibility him who gives it. 
Id. at 40. 
35. Hopefully, this contention was made for the last time in the Miranda oral 
arguments. Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 101 (Mr. Siegel on behalf of 
respondent in Vignera v. New York), on file in University of Michigan Law Library. 
36. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and 
Trial, 21 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 357, 372 (1966). 
37. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional 
Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, in POLICE PoWER AND IN· 
DIVIDUAL FREEDOM 223, 237 (Sowle ed. 1962). 
38. Id. at 241. 
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out the elementary fact that police have not been given the au-
thority to compel disclosures of any kind or whether the result is 
put on the ground that the person questioned is "privileged" not 
to answer makes little difference. Answers should not be compelled 
by police .... se 
(4) There is nothing very new or unusual about the problem 
which confronted the Court in Miranda; there is nothing really 
startling or inventive about the solution. I think it may fairly be 
said that the police station is the third field on which the basic issue 
in Miranda has been fought. The force of the privilege, or radia-
tions from it, led (in the seventeenth century) to the abolition of 
judicial interrogation at the trial itself, and (in the nineteenth 
century) to the disappearance of interrogation at the preliminary 
examination as well. These developments occurred at a time when 
"local prosecuting officials were almost unknown"40 and a "primitive 
constabulary . . . , consisting of watchmen rather than police 
officers and wanting in any detective personnel, attempted little 
in the way of interrogation of the persons they apprehended."41 
Eventually, "but wholly without express legal authorization,"42 in-
terrogation became the function of the emerging organized police 
and prosecuting forces. Moreover, I think it plain that the last 
stand will not be made in the stationhouse. By defining "custodial 
questioning" to mean "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way,"43 the Mi-
randa Court seemed to anticipate still other battlefields-the squad 
car, the streets, public places, and even homes. 
That over the centuries this problem has been popping up in 
different settings strongly indicates that the Miranda Court did not, 
!19. Id. at 2!17-38. 
40. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 86 (1959). 
41. Ibid. See also Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release 
or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 11, 16 n.29 (1962). 
In England, "it was not until 1842, thirteen years after the formation of the 
Metropolitan Police, that a small body was detached for detective work, and not 
until 1878 that the Criminal Investigation Department was formally created." DEVLIN, 
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 18 (1959). 
"In America the history of preliminary examination follows a course parallel to 
that run by the English institution whence it was derived." Kauper, judicial Exam-
ination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224, 
1235 (1932). 
42. MAYERS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 87. 
43. 384 U.S. at 444. The "significant" in "deprived of his freedom of action in 
any significant way" does not appear to be very significant, for at two other places 
the Court drops this qualification of deprivation of freedom constituting custodial 
questioning. Id. at 477, 478. 
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and did not need to, invoke a "new" fifth amendment. This history, 
however, is also consistent with the view that we cannot, never could 
for very long, and never will be able to live with the "old" one. 
It may be that in this area of the law we cannot do what we have 
done with respect to Brown v. Board of Education44 and Baker v. 
Carr,45 namely take our ideals down from the walls where we have 
kept them framed "to be pointed at with pride on ceremonial oc-
casions,"46 and "put flesh and blood" on them and "look them in 
the teeth."47 But this goes to Miranda's hope of posterity, not to 
its pride of ancestry. 
44. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
45. 369 u.s. 186 (1962) 
46. Schaefer, Comments [on Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney Behind?, 
54 KY. L.J. 464 (1966)], 54 KY. L.J. 521, 524 (1966). This symposium was held six 
months before Miranda was handed down. 
47. Ibid. 
Justice Schaefer also said, it should be noted, that "if the ideals are too 
broadly stated to meet essential practical objectives then I would suggest that the 
ideals must be modified and that we ought to be frank." Id. at 524. He indicated, 
further, that this might well be the case with respect to police interrogation: 
When it is suggested that the right to counsel be projected into the station house, 
there is an immediate response. Many voices answered-some stridently, but I 
think none more eloquently than [fellow-panelist] Mr. Kuh answered this morn· 
ing-saying that it is not possible to enforce criminal law unless station house 
interrogation in the absence of counsel is permitted. I think I share that view, 
but I don't know. , .. There just isn't anything very worthwhile to indicate 
what has happened and what would happen if station house interrogation were 
not permitted save in the presence of counsel. It scares me, but I don't know. 
Id. at 523. 
Miranda, however, does not "fully project" counsel into the stationhouse-at least 
not to the degree desired by some ACLU spokesmen. On learning of the Miranda 
decision, the executive director of the national group, John de J. Pemberton, Jr., 
tempered his enthusiasm by voicing "regret that the Court did not take the final 
step of stating that the privilege cannot be fully assured unless a suspect's lawyer is 
present during police station interrogation." N.Y. Times, June 14, 1966, p. 25, col. 1. 
Similarly, the director of the New York chapter (Aryeh Neier) commented: "[Miranda] 
doesn't go far enough in protecting those who most need protection. We do believe 
that a person must have the advice of counsel in order to intelligently waive the 
assistance of counsel." Ibid. 
To say that Miranda does permit some stationhouse questioning in the absence 
of counsel-if a duly advised suspect intelligently waives his right to the assistance 
of counsel-is not to quibble. Not if, as Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle Younger 
concluded (after surveying more than 1,000 post-Miranda cases, in fully half of 
which the defendant had made an incriminating statement): "Large or small, • • • 
conscience usually, or at least often, drives a guilty person to confess. If an in-
dividual wants to confess, a warning from a police officer, acting as required by 
recent decisions, is not likely to discourage him." OFFICE OF THE DisTRICT ATTORNEY, 
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES, RESULTS OF SURVEY CONDUCTED IN THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE OF Los ANGELES COUNTY REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF THE DORADO AND MIRANDA 
DECISIONS UPON THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY CASES 4 (Aug. 4, 1966) (copy on file 
in the University of Michigan Law Library). See also Brief for United States, p. 30 
n.20, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): "[T]he great majority of clear 
admissions or confessions are prompted either by conscience, by a desire to get the 
matter over with, or by a calculated design to secure more favorable treatment." 
But see Address by Richard H. Kuh of the New York Bar, Eighteenth Annual 
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I. "No SIGNIFICANT SuPPORT IN ••• HISTORY ••• oR ••. LANGUAGE" 
The Miranda majority's application of the privilege against self-
incrimination to police interrogation, insists dissenting Justice 
White, "has no significant support in the history of the privilege 
Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, Aug. 5, 1966, pp. 1, 4 (copy on file in 
the University of Michigan Law Library): 
If we are to be logical and intellectually honest, we must recognize there is rarely 
such a thing as Miranda contemplates-an ifttelligent, voluntary waiver of the 
Fifth Amendment privileges. • . . Had the United States Supreme Court recog· 
nized what I think is clear-at least the improbability, if not the impossibility, 
of an intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege-the judges might 
have squarely wrestled with the issue and said: Confessions are no longer usable 
in our adversary system." 
To the same effect is Nedrud, The New Fifth Amendment Concept: Self-Incrimination 
Redefined, 2 NAT'L DIST. Arr'vs Ass'N J. 112, 113 (1966), maintaining that "certainly, un-
der the requirements of the [Miranda] Court, no one in his 'right mind' would waive 
such rights." 
Whether suspects are continuing to confess because they don't understand the 
whole "formula" or because the police are "stretc!Iing the truth" when they claim they 
give the full warning, or because the promptings of conscience and the desire to get it 
over with are indeed overriding the impact of the warning, the fact remains that 
they are continuing to confess with great frequency-which would not have been 
the case if the Court had adopted the position taken by the aforementioned ACLU 
spokesman. Even Brooklyn District Attorney Aaron Koota, who has charged that the 
new rulings have "shackled" law enforcement, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1966, p. 1, col. 2, 
claims that only 40% of major felony suspects have refused to make statements after 
being warned of their rights. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 17, col. 1. Mr. Koota 
reported a sharp increase of refusals to talk after Miranda, but the commanding 
officer of one Manhattan detective squad reported that "by and large, they [suspects] 
readily admit what they've been doing even after they've been told of their rights." 
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1966, p. 1, col. 3. And Mr. Younger disclosed that "the per-
centage of cases in which confessions or admissions were made has not decreased, 
as might have been anticipated, because of the increased scope of the admonitions 
required by Miranda." Los ANGELES SuRVEY, op. cit. supra, at 3. 
The Miranda Court required enough things "at one gulp," for me at any rate, 
cf. 384 U.S. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting), but a rule that a suspect needs counsel to 
waive counsel is by no means unthinkable. The "waiver" standards are designed for 
judicial proceedings; no judge presides in the stationhouse. In oral argument, 
Justice Stewart raised the possibility that a suspect could not waive his constitutional 
rights without the advice of counsel and petitioner agreed "that this is the worst 
place for waiver" because "the party alleging waiver has control of the party alleged 
to have waived." Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument in Miranda and Companion 
Cases, p. 84 (oral argument of Mr. Earle for petitioner in Vignera v. New York), 
on file in University of Michigan Law Library. See also id. at 73. However, the 
Miranda opinion does not explicitly consider this possibility. The ACLU amicus 
brief, on the other hand, does not explicitly consider any other possibility. Rather, 
as I read it at any rate, the ACLU contends that effectuation of the privilege requires 
the "presence of counsel" (emphasis added), a phrase it employs a dozen times, 
Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, pp, 3, 4, 9, 22·25, 27·28, 33, not merely advice 
as to the immediate availability of counsel, a reading which finds support in the 
post·Miranda comments of the ACLU spokesmen, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1966, p. 25, 
col. I. The failure of the Court to deal explicitly with (if only to reject) the ACLU 
contention is surprising, for in all other respects the ACLU amicus brief presents 
"a conceptual, legal and structural formulation that is practically identical · to the 
majority opinion--even as to use of language in various passages of the opinion." 
Dash, Foreword to MEDAUE, FROM EsCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANATOMY OF A Su-
PREME COUII.T DECISION XVU (1966). 
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or in the language of the Fifth Amendment."48 The first authority 
he cites is the late Professor Edmund M. Morgan, who said that 
"there is nothing in the reports to suggest that [the rule excluding 
coerced confessions] ... has its roots in the privilege against self-
incrimination. And so far as the cases reveal, the privilege, as such, 
seems to have been given effect only in judicial proceedings, includ-
ing the preliminary examinations by authorized magistrates."49 
For Justice White to lead with Morgan is a bit puzzling, since 
further along in this same article Professor Morgan points out: 
The function which the police have assumed in interrogating 
an accused is exactly that of the early committing magistrates, and 
the opportunities for imposition and abuse are fraught with much 
greater danger .... Investigation by the police is not judicial, but 
when it consists of an examination of an accused, it is quite as much 
an official proceeding as the early English preliminary hearing be-
fore a magistrate, and it has none of the safeguards of a judicial 
proceeding. If the historical confines of the privilege are to be 
broadened, this surely is an area that needs inclusion for reasons 
infinitely more compelling than those applicable to the arraign-
ment. 
Mr. Wigmore himself declares that the protection of the priv-
ilege "extends to all manner of proceedings in which testimony is 
to be taken, whether litigious or not, and whether 'ex parte' or 
otherwise. It therefore applies in ... investigations by a legislature 
or a body having legislative functions, and in investigations by 
administrative officials." If so, how can testimony taken by the 
police be excluded?50 
Continues Justice White: 
Our own constitutional provision provides that no person "shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
These words, when "[c]onsidered in the light to be shed by gram-
mar and the dictionary appear to signify simply that nobody shall 
be compelled to give oral testimony against himself in a criminal 
proceeding under way in which he is a defendent." Corwin, The 
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 
29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2. And there is very little in the surrounding 
circumstances of the adoption of the Fifth Amendment or in the 
then existing state constitutions or in state practice which would 
give the constitutional provision any broader meaning. Mayers, 
48. 384 u.s. 436, 526 (1966). 
49. Ibid., quoting Morgan, The Privilege Against Self·lncrimination, 34 MINN. L. 
REv. 1, 18 (1949). 
50. Morgan, supra note 49, at 27·28, 29. (Emphasis in the original.) 
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The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Consti-
tutional or Common-Law?, 4 American Journal of Legal History 
107 (1960).111 
However, the Corwin article relied upon by Justice White does 
call attention to a circumstance surrounding the adoption of the 
fifth amendment which suggests that the constitutional provision 
is entitled to a broader meaning: 
The result [in late seventeenth century England of the extension 
from civil to criminal cases of the rule that a party is not a com-
petent witness _on account of interest] was that henceforth the mouth 
of an accused . . . was closed whether for or against himself; and 
it is in this form that the immunity of accused persons passed to 
the American colonies balanced, that is, by the corresponding dis-
ability. Not until 1878, following a similar reform in several of the 
states, was the right to testify in their own behalf, under oath, ac-
corded defendants in the national courts. 
[S]ince the [federal and early state) constitutional provisions ... 
did not overrule the common law in excluding an accused from the 
witness stand, their stipulation for his immunity taken by itself be-
comes pointless. If only, therefore, to save the framers of these pro-
visions from having loaded them with a meaningless tautology, their 
language had to be given other than its literal significance .... 112 
What does this immunity of the accused at that time signify? 
"Therefore," Dean Griswold argues, "the importance of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination [at that time] ... was in investiga-
tions, in inquiries, and with respect to questioning of the defendant 
by the judge in criminal cases, such as had been made notorious by 
Judge Jeffries."63 According to Professor Mayers, however, the im-
plications from the accused's incompetence to testify need not and 
should not carry us so far. He maintains that the privilege is not 
available to a mere witness, but only to an "accused," and that the 
privilege is given sufficient content and meaning if it is viewed as 
protecting an accused not sworn as a witness from interrogation by 
prosecutor or judge at the trial (a practice which continued in Eng-
land into the eighteenth century and in New York, at least, as late 
as the Revolution), or as protecting an accused from questioning 
before trial.rs4 In the same article invoked by Justice White, Pro-
fessor Mayers makes these points: 
51. 884 U.S. at 526-27. 
52. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 
29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 11-12. 
58. Griswold, The Individual and the Fifth Amendment, The New Leader, Oct. 
29, 1956, pp. 20, 22. 
54. 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 114 n.20 (1960). 
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The possibility that Madison and Ellsworth (the latter the chair-
man of the Senate committee responsible for these changes in ar-
rangement) may have had chiefly in mind the protection of the 
accused (and of the suspect not yet charged) from pre-trial ques-
tioning, rather than from questioning at the trial, is enhanced by 
the fact that the acccused was not at that time (or for nearly a cen-
tury thereafter) a competent witness at his trial . . . . [I]£ one con-
cedes, arguendo, that the protection of the accused on trial was not 
the object, it does not follow, as seems to be assumed, that the 
purpose of the provision must have been to protect the witness. It 
could just as well have been intended to protect the accused or the 
suspect before trial. It is perhaps relevant that Madison's own state 
had had experience with oppressive questioning of suspects by the 
royal governor just before the Revolution.115 
In 1833 appeared Story's monumental treatise [apparently the 
first treatise on the Constitution which discusses the privilege] .... 
His discussion of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment discloses a complete unawareness of its application to the 
witness, and seems indeed to confine the intention of the provision 
to the accused in the pretrial stage-to stress the protection against 
executive oppression of the accused.56 
Professor Mayers, one may fairly conclude, is bent on overruling 
Counselman v. Hitchcock, not on precluding Miranda v. Arizona. 
Professor Mayers, I think it fair to say, regards the application of 
the privilege to legislative investigations as a much sharper de-
parture from the understanding of the draftsmen who framed the 
self-incrimination provision, the Congress which proposed it and 
the state legislatures which ratified it, than the application of the 
privilege to police interrogation. 
If for no other reason than that there were no professional police 
either in England or America when the privilege was drafted and 
ratified, or at least the police had not yet assumed the functions of 
criminal investigation, the extent to which Miranda marks a de-
parture from the "original understanding" will probably never be 
55. Ibid. (Emphasis in the original.) 
56. Id. at 121. (Emphasis in the original.) 
Professor Mayers is referring to 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 1782 (1833): 
[The privilege against self-incrimination] also is but an affirmance of a common 
law privilege. But it is of inestimable value. It is well known, that in some 
countries, not only are criminals compelled to give evidence against themselves, 
but are subjected to the rack or torture in order to procure a confession of 
guilt. And what is worse, it has been (as if in mockery or scorn) attempted to 
excuse, or justify it, upon the score of mercy and humanity to the accused. It 
has been contrived, (it is pretended,) that innocence should manifest itself by a 
stout resistance, or guilt by a plain confession; as if a man's innocence were 
to be tried by the hardness of his constitution, and his guilt by the sensibility 
of his nerves. 
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fully settled. This is not to say, however, that a sketch of the his-
tory of pre-police interrogation is unilluminating. 
To begin at what should be a sufficient starting point for our 
purposes, justices of the peace in England were empowered by the 
middle of the fourteenth century "to take and arrest all those that 
they may find by indictment, or by suspicion and to put them in 
prison."57 Two centuries later, the emergent practice of making 
some kind of examination of suspects before committing them for 
formal accusation was legalized by the Statutes of Philip and Mary 
(1554-55).58 The "object" of these statutes was "to expose and detect 
a man assumed to be guilty"; 59 pursuant to them "a justice of the 
peace really acted as police, constable, detective, prosecuting at-
torney, examining magistrate and complaining witness."60 By the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, writes Professor Kauper, "the 
spirit" of the now fully established rule against self-incrimination 
"must have been carried over to the preliminary examination, for 
in this examination there was evident a gradual abandonment of 
judicial interrogation of the accused. The practice developed of 
taking only a voluntary statement by the accused after cautioning 
his as to his rights . . . [The] practice was developing of permitting 
the accused to have counsel at this examination."61 The Statutes 
of Philip and Mary were formally repealed in 1848,62 but "long 
before" that, the "inquisitional preliminary examination ... had 
sunk into oblivion and a purely judicial inquiry had supplanted 
it."63 
In America, the history of preliminary examination ran a par-
allel course. Colonial magistrates "rigorously examined persons 
suspected of crime ... after the manner of the English justice of 
the peace."64 In 1641, "when the [Massachusetts] colony was trou-
bled by a wave of vicious criminality [when wasn't there a 'crime 
crisis'?], Governor Bellingham consulted the elders of the New 
England churches on the question 'how far a magistrate might exact 
57. The Justices of the Peace Act, I360, 34 Edw. 3, c. I. 
58. I & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13, § 4 (1554); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10, § 2 (1555); see 
MoLEY, OuR CRIMINAL CouRTS I5 (I930). 
59. I STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 22I (I883). 
60. Kauper, judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 
30 MICH. L. REv. I224, I233 (I932). See generally 5 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENG-
usH LAw I91-92 (1924); Grant, Our Common Law Constitution, 40 B.U.L. REv. I, 
10-12 (1960); I STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 22I-25. 
61. Kauper, supra note 60, at 1233-34. 
62. II & 12 Viet., c. 42, § 18 (1848). 
63. Kauper, supra note 60, at 1234. 
64. HAsKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSEITS 174 (1960). 
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a confession from a delinquent in capital cases?' "65 In their study 
of colonial New York, Goebel and Naughton, citing examples largely 
from the early and middle eighteenth century, reported "numerous 
cases where the minutes reveal the reading at the trial of a pris-
oner's confession. It had to be proved by the magistrate who took it, 
but otherwise no further formalities were observed."66 They point 
out that "although a confession could only be introduced if not 
made under oath, it would serve to convict without corroborating 
evidence, if the defendant had pleaded not guilty in open court."67 
Since the felony defendant conducted his own defense and was thus 
directly vulnerable to questioning from the bench . . . the most 
dangerous juncture at a trial for the defendant-counsel was the 
moment when the Crown introduced a confession taken by a justice 
at a preliminary hearing. . . . Obviously if a defendant had any 
remarks to make about his earlier words, he would likely find him-
self answering questions from the bench [and] ... where he had 
made more than one preliminary statement and had contradicted 
himself, the introduction of all the "confessions" would tempt him 
to unguarded speech, or he might be asked to explain.68 
Although the transference of criminal investigation functions 
from magistrates to police did not occur as sharply in this country 
as it did in England, 69 and there were forces other than the use of 
the privilege which were inimical to a magistrate's exercise of police 
functions in America,7° it may be said that "the establishment of 
the rule against self-incrimination, with its significant reaction in 
England resulting in abolition of the practice of interrogating the 
accused, had the same effect in the American colonies. Formal con-
stitutional recognition of the rule contributed to the tradition al-
ready accumulating against exercise of inquisitorial powers by the 
magistrate or justice of the peace."71 It may also be said that "if 
65. ld. at 201. 
66. GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, LAw ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YoRK 654 (1944). 
67. Id. at 653. 
68. Id. at 653·54. 
69. See .Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 
50 CAUF. L. REV. II, 17 n.39 (1962). 
70. Professor Pound points to "the idea of separation of powers, so much insisted 
on in the American polity," which "judicialized" the preliminary examination "before 
the institution of a modern police had developed, and so left a gap which in 
practice had to be filled outside of law." POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 88 
(1929). Professor Moley, however, suggests that in many American communities there 
may not have been much of "a gap," commenting that "the early development of the 
county prosecutor as an aggressive agent of law enforcement, and the power and 
prestige of the sheriff in all frontier communities, probably prevented the justice of 
the peace and the city magistrates from assuming much importance as investigators 
of crimes and suspected criminals." MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 58, at 20. 
71. Kauper, supra note 60, at 1236. 
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the police are permitted to interrogate an accused under the pres· 
sure of compulsory detention to secure a confession . . . they are 
doing the very same acts which historically the judiciary was doing 
in the seventeenth century but which the privilege against self-in· 
crimination abolished."72 In this connection it is quite instructive, 
I believe, to turn to mid-nineteenth century criticism of judicial 
"examination" in New York, where that practice survived, rela· 
tively late, until that time. Indeed, the analysis of the alleged evils 
in and suggested remedies for the "examination" as spelled out by 
the Commissioners on Practice and Pleading73 in the course of 
submitting their proposed Code of Criminal Procedure to the New 
York Legislature in the year 1849 so strikingly parallels the Miranda 
discussion-if we but substitute "interrogation" for "examination" 
and "police" for "magistrate"-that I cannot resist the temptation 
to quote from that remarkable report at length: 74 
. . . [I]n the early stages of the accusation,-when he is hurried 
before a magistrate upon a charge of which he may be innocent, 
and of which, even if it be otherwise, the law has not yet adjudged 
him guilty,-the first dictate of duty seems to be, to inform [the ac· 
cused] ... of his rights and to afford him every opportunity to 
throw around himself the protection of the law. And yet, according 
to the existing system of practice, upon the idle fiction that every 
man is presumed to know the law, he is supposed to be informed 
of the first right secured to him by the Constitution,-that of ap-
pearing and defending himself by counsel. If he happens to be 
ignorant of this, the examination of the case proceeds, and testi-
mony is taken against him which may be illegal in its character, or 
which, without the substantial opportunity for a cross examination, 
may in some contingencies be used against him on his trial. 
Against this prejudice the Commissioners propose to guard, by 
requiring the magistrate to inform the defendant of his right to 
the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and before any 
further proceedings are had,-to allow the defendant a reasonable 
time to procure counsel,-and to send for such counsel in the city 
or town, as the defendant may name. (Sec. 180, 181.) 
In this proceeding [the "examination" by the magistrate], the 
Commissioners have discovered principles which they deem at war 
with the rights of the accused. The very term "examination," which 
72. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 104 (1955). 
7!1. The commissioners were David Dudley Field, David Graham and Arphaxed 
Loomis. 
74. COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, REP'T No. 4-CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE XXV, XXvii-xxix (1849). 
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is used in the statute, and the proceedings pointed out as the mode 
of taking it, all seem to be a departure from the spirit of the con-
stitutional declaration, which provides that "no person shall be 
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." 
The object of the examination, as it was originally instituted, was, 
not to place the defendant in the hands of a cross-examining magis-
trate, who might, according to the principles of the French practice, 
by the exercise of ingenuity, extract from the defendant evidence 
of his guilt. But it was designed, in the humane and benign spirit 
of the common law, to give the defendant an opportunity, by a 
voluntary explanation, to exculpate himself from the charge .... 
Instead of his being informed, as the fact is, that [the "examina-
tion"] is furnished to him as a shield and is not to be used against 
him as a sword, he is by a loose course of practice, if no other 
motive be imputable, led to believe that it is one of the ordinary 
proceedings against him, having in view the establishment of his 
guilt. He is accordingly examined by a series of searching questions, 
oftentimes proceeding upon the assumption of his guilt, and is 
driven to the alternative of equivocating as to the facts, or of de-
nying circumstances plainly true, or of what is occasionally his re-
sort, declining to answer. Those who are in the slightest degree 
conversant with criminal trials, can well attest how successfully the 
adoption of either of these alternatives, can be used against the 
defendant on his trial. . . . 
[T]he Commissioners have proposed to dispense entirely with this 
examination, and to substitute in its place, what the law designed 
should alone be furnished, an opportunity to the defendant to 
make a statement in his exculpation. They accordingly provide, 
that when the examination of the witnesses on the part of the 
people is closed, the magistrate shall inform the defendant that it 
is his right to make a statement in relation to the charge against 
him; that the statement is designed to enable him, if he sees fit, to 
answer the charge, and to explain the facts alleged against him:-
that he is at liberty to waive it,-and that his waiver cannot be 
used against him on the trial. (Sec. 188.) If he elect to make the 
statement, it is then to be taken by the magistrate, who, instead of 
being left at liberty to put every form of question which his in-
genuity may suggest, is restricted to asking the defendant general 
questions as to his age and residence and the like, and to asking 
him to give any explanation he may think proper, of the circum-
stances appearing against him, and to state any facts which he 
thinks will tend to his exculpation. (Sec. 190.) ... 
On the other side of the Atlantic, but a year earlier-1848, the 
very year the Statutes of Philip and Mary were formally repealed-
a Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the state of the 
criminal law in the Channel Islands found "objectionable" "the 
preliminary examinations 'au secret,' and the consequent interroga-
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toire of the accused,"75 despite the fact that "the present practice 
... requires that [the prisoner] be told that he cannot be compelled 
to answer the questions of the Court, and that what he says will 
be used against him at the trial."76 Again, the Commissioners' com-
ments on the relationship between the "right of silence" and the 
right to counsel have obvious application to the Miranda contro-
versy:77 
[The prisoner] is not allowed the assistance of Counsel, who would 
probably advise him not to answer. Such a privilege would amount 
to the abolition of the interrogatoire. In truth, a voluntary in-
terrogatoire is a contradiction; and the compulsion of the process, 
once physical but still moral, is not the least objectionable part of 
the system. The caution to abstain from answering, if the party 
thinks fit, is always given in words; but a prisoner, acting without 
counsel, will almost always, in practice, feel himself bound to an-
swer. Then the questions put are those which arise from evidence 
which has been so arranged (and quite properly) as to give the 
fullest effect to the prima facie case of accusation. The answers 
given to such questions are given at a great disadvantage; and, 
probably, this disadvantage is even exaggerated by the prisoner, 
who is pressed with the circumstances of suspicion marshalled in 
their most formidable order. Hence arises a temptation to evade 
and deceive, by which an ignorant person would be seduced, how-
ever innocent of the offence charged. Another very dangerous fea-
ture in this practice appears to be that its tendency is to engage 
the Court, which conducts the examination, in a contest with the 
prisoner .... 
"It is impossible to deny the efficacy of the present practice as 
an instrument for the occasional detection of crime," conceded the 
Commissioners, "but it is equally clear that the practice is liable 
to mislead, even when administered with the purest intentions."78 
"We have no doubt," they hastened to add, "that the members of 
the Royal Court were perfectly sincere in assuring us that it is 
often of the greatest use to a prisoner, and that they never knew 
an innocent man condemned in conse<;_uence of it. But it appears 
to us dangerous to make legal guilt depend upon anything short of 
proof from extrinsic evidence or the voluntary confession of the 
accused. " 79 
75. COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS, REP'T No. 2 (1848), 
reprinted in 8 Rep. St. Tr. 1210 (N. S. 1850-58) (App. C). 
76. !d. at 1200. This marked "a departure from the old law in Terrien and the 
Approbation, by which the accused in refusing to answer or not answering pertinently, 
would be subjected to the torture." Ibid. 
77. !d. at 1211-12. 
78. !d. at 1212. 
79. Ibid. 
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II. "TRAINED INcAPACITY" AND THOSE WHo LAcKED IT 
Why did the fictions exposed in the 1840's have to be exposed 
anew in the 1960's? Why did the old abuses in new forms so persist 
and flourish? 
For one thing, as I indicated at the outset, the "legal mind" 
(unhappily) was equal to the task of seeming to reconcile the grim 
facts with lofty principles: police interrogation-indeed, the "third 
degree"-did not violate the privilege because the questioning did 
not involve any kind of judicial process for the taking of testi-
mony.80 This "trained incapacity" (to use Veblen's phrase) to see 
the problem in the round was long utilized by those who possessed 
it not only to shut from their minds the de facto inquisitorial sys-
tem, but also to thwart attempts to mitigate such a system by "for-
malizing" or "judicializing" it. For example, when, in the early 
1940's, a member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure advocated as a cure for the abuses of secret 
police interrogation a system whereby a judicial officer would ques-
tion a suspect only after informing the suspect "of his right to the 
advice of counsel, that he is under no obligation to answer any 
question, that any answer he chooses to give may possibly be used 
against him, and that his refusal to answer cannot be used against 
him,"81 the recommendation was rejected "as being contrary to the 
basic traditions of Anglo-American criminal procedure, and as prob-
ably violative of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimina-
tion."82 Why basic traditions were honored and self-incrimination 
problems avoided in the absence of these important safeguards was 
not made clear. Perhaps this is what Mr. Dooley meant when he 
told us that he "knowed a society wanst to vote a monyment to a 
man an' refuse to help his fam'ly, all in wan night." 
Some men are brash enough to write books about the law with-
out adequate "legal conditioning." One such man was Ernest J. 
Hopkins, an official investigator employed by the Wickersham Com-
mission. According to Zechariah Chafee, Hopkins showed "notable 
skill and enterprise in breaking through the barriers of silence 
80. Even those who pointed out that "the private or secret interrogation of arrested 
persons ... has become ... in many cases the foundation of scandal, harsh criticism 
and judicial condemnation" conceded that the privilege against self·incrimination 
"is obviously limited to judicial statements." ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 38, 
comment at 182 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1928). 
81. FED. R. CruM. P. 249 (Prelim. Draft 1943) (Professor Waite's proposed Additional 
Rule 6.1). 
82. FED. R. CruM. P. 253 (Prelim. Draft 1943) (reply memurandum prepared by 
Secretary of Advisory Committee). (Emphasis added.) 
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which surround official lawlessness."83 However, being a newspaper-
man by profession rather than a lawyer, Mr. Hopkins showed a 
notable lack of skill and enterprise in grasping why the privilege 
against self-incrimination meant so much in the courtroom but so 
little in the police station. Thus, five years before Brown v. Missis-
sippi and thirty-five years before Miranda v. Arizona, this "un-
trained observer" said of the prevailing definitions of the "third 
degree" (e.g., "rigid and severe examination," "oppressive methods," 
infliction of "suffering"): 84 
[T]hese definitions convey no hint as to the legality or illegality of 
the basic process or the methods used therein. There is a funda-
mental right possessed by the American citizen ... set forth in the 
Fifth Amendment in the following words: 
Nor shall any person ... be compelled in a criminal case to 
be a witness against himself. 
This strikes directly at the heart of the situation; I do not see why 
one should seek farther than the Constitution for a clear definition 
of the third degree. The gross unlawfulness of the practice is thus 
stated by implication: 
The third degree is the compelling of a person in a criminal 
case to be a witness against himself. 
The use of the more objective concept of compulsion, borrowed 
from the Constitution . . . gets us down to the central question, 
the legitimacy of the pre-trial inquisition itself. 
There are a thousand forms of compulsion; our police show 
great ingenuity in the variety employed. But any and all forms of 
compulsion, with the object of securing confessions, must violate 
the constitutional guarantee ... Our police, from the moment a 
man falls into their hands in an important case, hound him with 
the persistent demand "Confess." They may use violence and tor-
ture or they may not; but in either case the secret police-held grill-
ing or sweating violates the time-honored and peculiarly important 
restraint by which Americans, and the English before them, have 
sought to protect themselves against official tyranny. 
For those troubled by the spectac1e of a man so unfamiliar with 
prevailing legal reasoning writing a book about the law, it should 
be pointed out by way of mitigating circumstances that even emi-
nent lawyers have (happily) demonstrated a surprising lack of 
"trained incapacity" to see the fairly obvious in this area. Take 
Zechariah Chafee, for example. Chafee knew better. In the early 
1930's he had recognized, albeit not been impressed by, the legal 
83. HoPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE vii (1931) (Preface). 
84. Id. at 193-95. (Emphasis in the original.) 
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reasoning which led to the checking of the privilege at the door of 
the interrogation room.8~ However, he forgot this a generation 
later. Indeed, this oversight permeated his defense of the privilege 
in the 1950's: 
There are at least three reasons for the privilege against self-in-
crimination. In the first place, although it plainly interferes with 
short-time efficiency by making it harder to discover facts through 
questioning, the privilege is likely to promote long-time efficiency. 
If prosecutors and police could count on grilling a suspect as 
much as they pleased, they might not take the trouble to build up 
a solid case from objective proofs .... 
The second reason for stoutly maintaining the right of every 
man not to be "compelled ... to be a witness against himself" is 
that it protects us from something far worse than answering ques-
tions. Nothing else in the Constitution prevents government officials 
and policemen from extorting confessions . .. ,86 
Similarly, Dean Erwin Griswold, who wrote a famous little book 
on the subject, displayed what some might regard as a woeful lack 
of the requisite special "training": 
We may better understand the importance of the Fifth Amend-
ment by considering what not having it would mean .... If we are 
not willing to let the Amendment be invoked, where, over time, 
are we going to stop when police, prosecutors, or chairmen want 
to get people to talk?B7 
Somewhat surprisingly, in a book billed as "challenging much 
of the legal folklore which abounds in the discussion of the subject 
85. Since the privilege exists during the trial in open court of a person who 
has been formally charged with crime, it seems even more applicable to the 
preliminary inquisition of a suspect by police or prosecutors before any judi-
cial proceeding or formal charge. It is true that there is some difference of 
opinion whether the third degree violates the privilege against self·incrimination; 
a few courts say that it does not because the questioning does not involve any 
kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony. This seems a narrow limita· 
tion of a constitutional right. 
Chafee, Pollak & Stem, The Third Degree, in NATIONAL CoMMISSION oN LAw OBSER· 
VANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 26-27 (1931). 
86. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LiBERTY 186, 188 (1956). (Emphasis added.) Chafee 
maintained that "the partial incorporation of [the self-incrimination] clause in the 
Fourteenth Amendment has made it possible for the Supreme Court to reverse 
several state convictions based on coerced confessions ••.. " Id. at 189. The Court, 
per Brennan, J., did so look back on the "coerced confession" cases in Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964). See also Justice Black, joined by the Chief Justice, dissenting 
in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 131 (1961). But it is not easy to see how, under 
any concept of "hard-core" self-incrimination implicit in due process, the Court could 
have sustained some of the state confessions it did. See Kamisar, Equal justice in 
the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JusTICE 
IN OUR TIME 47·49 (Howard ed. 1965). 
87. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ToDAY 75 (1955). (Emphasis added.) 
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by E. N. Griswold,"88 Professor Sidney Hook challenged Griswold 
(and Chafee) only obliquely on this point. Evidently Professor 
Hook's abundant "common sense" and wide reading in the law 
failed to compensate for his lack of "formal legal training." Hook 
took a dim view of the privilege generally. But he, too, seemed to 
take for granted its applicability to police interrogation (although, 
quite understandably, he belittled the protection it had in fact 
provided up to that time for the person subjected to police ques-
tioning): 
The use of third degree methods against suspects has always 
been widespread despite the recognition of the privilege against 
self-incrimination .... This may be granted and the assertion made 
that the situation would be much worse if the privilege were not 
recognized. There seems good reason to doubt this .... Whatever 
Constitutional protection the privilege against self-incrimination 
gives in safeguarding [a person] from lawless police officers is given 
just as effectively by the due process clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Further, even if it were retained to reinforce 
bulwarks against illegal practices of arresting authorities, its mean· 
ing could be so modified as to permit the invocation of the priv-
ilege to be cited explicitly by counsel in pleading before bench or 
jury as relevant evidence in the case. 
Dean Griswold insinuates several times that the Fifth Amend-
ment is the most important, if not the only, bar to torture, and 
that its retention prevents the introduction of police state methods 
of medieval techniques brought up to date . . . . [I]n general, as 
we have seen in commenting on Professor Chafee, all that would be 
required, even in the complete absence of the Fifth Amendment, 
would be the right to be questioned only in the presence of coun-
sel, to cut the ground from under the objection.s9 
There goes Professor Hook, showing his lack of "formal legal 
training" again. "Common sense" would suggest, as Chafee put it, 
that "a person accused of crime needs a lawyer right after his arrest 
probably more than at any other time."90 At the time Hook made 
these remarks, however, the right to the assistance of counsel was 
deemed inapplicable to police interrogation because the "criminal 
prosecution" had not yet begun. 
In a sense, conditioning police questioning on the presence of 
counsel-that, of course, is "all" that Miranda requires-does dis-
88. See inside cover of paperback edition (Henry Regnery Co., 1963). 
89. HoOK, CoMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 45-46, 58 (1957). (Emphasis 
added.) 
90. CHAFEE, DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 541 (1952), quoted With 
approval in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 446 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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pense with the need for the privilege against self-incrimination at 
this stage-in the same way that conditioning police "encourage-
ment" on the presence of counsel would dispense with the need for 
the entrapment defense. But why should the presence of counsel 
be required and why should we "effectively preclude police ques-
tioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused [is J afforded op-
portunity to call his attorney"91-in the complete absence of the fifth 
amendment? 
As is evidenced by the easy assumptions made years ago by those 
who (fortunately) never acquired the "trained incapacity" to see 
the problem, the application of the privilege to police interroga-
tion can be defended as either a logical deduction from the consti-
tutional provision or a practical condition upon its successful opera-
tion. Moreover, this approach finds much historical support in the 
Anglo-American experience with prototypes of modern police inter-
rogation (much more support than can be produced to warrant the 
application of the privilege to legislative investigations and civil 
proceedings).92 Assuming, arguendo, that in order to give the priv-
ilege a reading "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to 
guard,"93 the Court did violence to language and history, the assault 
occurred, in aggravated form, long ago: 
Is it not clear that a legislative investigation is not a "criminal 
case"? What application, then, does the constitutional provision 
have in such proceedings-or in civil trials, or elsewhere, where 
persons may be subjected to questioning? This is a question which 
was raised and answered long ago, so long ago in fact that lawyers 
tend to take it for granted. But early courts saw that the protection 
of the amendment itself would be an empty gesture if it was lit-
erally applied. For example, if the witness is required to answer 
self-incriminating questions in a civil trial, or in a legislative in-
vestigation, the prosecuting officer can use his answers to provide 
evidence on which he can be prosecuted or convicted. Even if the 
prosecuting officer cannot use his testimony itself, he can, from that 
testimony, learn other facts which he could use in the prosecu-
tion .... 
For this reason, courts long ago concluded that if the privilege 
is to be effective at all it must be given a comprehensive applica-
tion, and thus must prevent compulsory self-incrimination in any 
proceeding. This is, indeed, a broad construction of the constitu-
91. See note 104 infra and accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., Mayers, The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: 
Constitutional or Common-Law, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 107 (1960); Pittman, The Fifth 
Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956); Williams, 
Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FoRDHAM L. REv. 19 (1955). 
93. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892), quoted with approval in 
Miranda v. Arizona, !184 U.S. 4!16, 459-60 (1966). 
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tiona! language, but it is a construction which has seemed to be 
required if the basic objective of that language is to be realized.D4 
III. "NEcESSITY" AND OTHER FoRCES 
What would we say of the argument that the fourth amendment 
does not apply to arrests and searches made without warrants alto-
gether, but only prohibits the use of evidence seized pursuant to 
defective warrants?95 Does it make any more sense to argue that the 
fifth amendment does not apply to questioning by agents of the 
state who lack any kind of judicial process for the taking of testi-
mony, but only governs proceedings involving such process? More-
over, it so happened that the Supreme Court frequently advanced 
the privilege against self-incrimination as the constitutional basis 
for the federal exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases during 
most of the period the privilege was deemed inapplicable to police 
94. GIUswoLD, op. cit. supra note 87, at 54-55. 
95. The government came close to making this argument in United States v. 
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), when it contended that general, exploratory searches 
could be made incident to a lawful arrest, although such power could not be con-
ferred by a search warrant. Brief for the United States, pp. 13, 15, 37 n.6. (Emphasis 
added): 
[T]he principles crystallized in the Fourth Amendment were not intended to 
limit the right of search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest .... Nor, we 
submit, was the search conducted by the officers in the present case a "general 
exploratory search" of the kind which the framers of the Constitution intended 
to prohibit by the Fourth Amendment. The abuse there aimed at was the prac-
tice of issuing general warrants without probable cause. The generality pro-
hibited was not primarily the generality of the search actually conducted but 
the generality of the authority to search without any reasonable basis for belief 
that crime had been committed. . . . The Amendment does not consist of two 
sentences with a break after the word "violated." It is all one sentence, and 
the provision that no warrants shall issue except upon probable cause illustrates 
what is meant by the provision that the right of the people to be free of un-
reasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. "The term 'unreasonable' 
in the constitutions of the States [identical with the Fourth Amendment] has 
allusion to what had been practiced before our revolution, and especially, to 
general search warrants, on which the person, place, or thing was not described." 
The government's views did not prevail in Lefkowitz, but there have been occasions 
when the Court has ruled, in effect, that a search without warrant confers greater 
authority than a search under warrant. See generally LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
AND TilE SUPREME COURr ch. iv (1966). 
The government's argument in Lefkowitz was topped by the opinion of the court 
in Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727 (1924), which stated that evidence obtained 
by an officer acting either without a warrant or under a void warrant was admissible 
in a criminal prosecution because "we believe the framers of the Constitution of 
the United States, and of this and other States, merely sought to provide against 
any attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to authorize, justify or declare lawful any 
unreasonable search or seizure" and "if an official, or a mere petty agent of the State, 
exceeds or abuses the authority with which he is clothed, he is to be deemed as 
acting, not for the State, but for himself only; and therefore he alone, and not the 
State, should be held accountable for his acts." Id. at 740. (Emphasis in the original.) 
The grounds advanced in Hall for admitting illegally seized evidence were familiar 
ones at that time. See CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9 (2d ed. 19.30). 
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questioning.96 If absent legal process the privilege was not supposed 
to apply, why wasn't the federal government allowed all these years 
to use evidence obtained by officers who did not bother to get any 
warrant at all?97 
The view that police interrogation is not limited or affected by 
the privilege against self-incrimination because it does not involve 
any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony had a great 
deal more to commend it than merely the inherent force of its 
"logic" or the self-restraint and tenderness of the exempted class 
of interrogators. It must have had, in order for it to have been 
taken so seriously for so long. 
Among the forces at work was one of society's most effective 
analgesics-"necessity," real or apparent.98 Its influence may be 
seen in numerous opinions. Although Justice Jackson recognized, 
in his much-quoted concurring opinion in Watts v. Indiana, that 
"if the State may ... interrogate without counsel, there is no deny-
ing the fact that it largely negates the benefits of the constitutional 
guaranty,"99 he was willing to let this "negation" occur for other-
wise "the people of this country must discipline themselves to see-
ing their police stand by helplessly while those suspected of murder 
prowl about unmolested."100 Again, the first axiom of Justice Frank-
furter's dissertation on police interrogation and confessions in 
Culombe v. Connecticut is: "Questioning suspects is indispensable 
in law enforcement."101 "Questioning," as Justice Frankfurter and 
many others used the term, is a "shorthand" for questioning with-
96. See LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 95, at 77. Indeed, Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886), "the first Fourth Amendment case of real consequence" and, "in the 
Court's own view [in 1925], the leading case on the subject of search and seizure" 
(LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra at 49), regarded the privilege against self-incrimination as the 
constitutional backbone of the exclusionary rule. 
97. I am only talking about "consistency" between the approach to searches and 
seizures and self-incrimination on the one hand, and the approach to confessions 
and self-incrimination on the other, not addressing myself to the merits of basing 
the exclusionary rule on the fifth amendment. On the merits, as I have indicated 
elsewhere, I think there is little to be said for it. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten 
Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 4lJ MINN. L. REv. 
1083, 1088-90 n.l6 (1959). 
98. It appears to be relatively easy, however, for a given generation to see how the 
dangers which gripped a previous generation were "much exaggerated." The point 
is made in Chafee, Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech, 1 KAN. L. REv. 1, 4-6 
(1952). 
99. lJ38 u.s. 49, 59 (1949). 
100. Id. at 61·62. 
101. 367 U.S. 568, 578 (1961). There was no majority opinion. See text at notes 
155-59 infra. 
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out advising the suspect of his rights or permitting defense counsel, 
friends or relatives to be present.l02 
For the police to persist in interrogating a suspect after deny-
ing his specific request to contact his lawyer is unfair and coercive, 
and any resulting confession should be excluded, contended peti-
tioner in Crooker v. California.l03 Such a rule, retorted a 5-4 ma-
jority of the Court, per Clark, J., "would have a . . . devastating 
effect on enforcement of criminal law, for it would effectively pre-
clude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused 
was afforded opportunity to call his attomey."104 Had issue been 
joined? The Court seemed to think so. What the Crooker majority 
meant to say, I believe, was: We are convinced that precluding (or 
postponing) police questioning until a suspect's specific request 
to consult with his lawyer is honored would have a devastating 
effect on law enforcement (on the eve of Miranda, law enforcement 
would have been delighted to settle for this); 1011 we must conclude, 
102. Justice Frankfurter went on to say: 
But if it is once admitted that questioning of suspects is permissible, whatever 
reasonable means are needed to make the questioning effecth·e must also be con-
ceded to the police .... Often the place of questioning will have to be a police 
interrogation room, [in part] because it is important to assure the proper atmos-
phere of privacy and non-distraction if questioning is to be made produc-
tive .... Legal counsel for the suspect will generally prove a thorough obstmc-
tion to the investigation. Indeed, even to inform the suspect of his legal right 
to keep silent will prove an obstmction. 
367 U.S. at 579-80. 
lOll. 357 U.S. 433 (1958). 
104. ld. at 441. 
105. It now appears that (in a number of jurisdictions, at least) recognition of a 
right to retained counsel per request in Crooker would not have affected then-exist-
ing practice very much. Three years ago, Major Robert Murray, then chief of the 
District of Columbia Police Department, testified that "over the years if a man was 
arrested and said 'I want a lawyer' he was given an opportunity to call a lawyer," 
Hearings on S. 486 and H.R. 7525 Before the Senate Committee on the District of 
Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 462 (1963), and that the long-established practice was 
that when a person said " 'I want a lawyer,' why there is no use wasting time with 
him. Just get him a lawyer," Id. at 470. Reporting on the practice in mid-Western 
cities in the late 1950's, Professor Wayne LaFave disclosed: 
[R]etained counsel often do enter a case shortly after arrest and immediately 
confer with their clients or are present when the case reaches the district attorney's 
office. In Milwaukee, they may actually sit in on the police interrogation. Indigent 
suspects are not afforded counsel at these early stages .... Actually turning away 
counsel who appears at the station to talk with his client is not a common 
occurrence. 
LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPEcr INTO CUSTODY 393-94 (Remington 
ed. 1965). 
On the eve of Miranda, law enforcement officers also would have been happy to 
settle for the four hour "preliminary screening" period proposed by the Reporters 
for the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. See MoDEL ConE OF PRE-ARRAIGN· 
MENT PROCEDURE § 4.04 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). Less than a decade ago, however, 
the "dean" of American prosecutors had maintained that "frequently, even forty-
eight to seventy-two hours is not enough." Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 
52 Nw. U.L. REV. 2, 9 (1957). More recently, a spokesman for the National Sheriff's 
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therefore, that absent additional coercive factors, such questioning 
is "fair." 
Other significant factors operating over many decades to freeze 
the status quo were the invisibility of the process-"no other case 
comes to mind in which an administrative official is permitted the 
broad discretionary power assumed by the police interrogator, to-
gether with the power to prevent objective recordation of the 
facts"106-and the failure of influential groups to identify with 
those segments of our society which furnish most of the raw material 
for the process. "One of the most powerful features of the Due 
Process Model," Professor Herbert Packer recently observed, "is 
that it thrives on visibility. People are willing to be complacent 
about what goes on in the criminal process as long as they are not 
too often or too explicitly reminded of the gory details."107 Society, 
one might add, does not want to be reminded, does not "want to 
know about criminals, but it does want them put away, and it is 
incurious how this can be done provided it is done."108 It stings 
too much to say it now, for we are too close to it, but someday it 
will be said of the first two-thirds of the twentieth century: Too 
many people, good people, viewed the typical police suspect and 
his interrogator as garbage and garbage collector, respectively. (This 
is every bit as unfortunate for the officer as it is for the suspect.) 
Association thought forty-eight hours was "reasonable", Hearings on S. 486 and 
H.R. 7525, supra, at 300 (Sheriff Canlis), and the head of the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police plumped for "at least twenty-four hours, excluding days when 
courts are not in session," ibid. at 293 (Chief Schrotel). 
In the 1963 Senate Hearings, David Acheson, then United States Attorney for the 
District of Columbia, departed from what might be called "the police-prosecution 
party line" by testifying that "in some very high percentage of the cases a confes-
sion is made if it b going to be made at all, within an hour or two, perhaps three 
hours after arrest. . . . In the great majority of cases a confession is made fairly 
promptly after arrest." Hearings on S. 486 and H.R. 7525, supra, at 443. In March of 
this year, on the eve of the oral argument in Miranda, Chief John B. Layton of the 
District of Columbia Police Department termed his department's current policy f?l 
"limited stationhouse testimony-with an upper limit of three hours"-"helpful." He 
disclosed that "admissions or statements" from suspects had been obtained in "about 
half" the criminal cases involving questioning and that "about seventy-five per cent" 
of these were obtained in one hour or less. Washington Post, March 4, 1966, p. B-2, 
col. I. Two days after Miranda was handed down, however, in a statement which 
"appeared to contradict" his earlier views, Chief Layton pointed to the three-hour 
maximum on stationhouse questioning as one reason why his department had "closed 
what he believes to be an all-time low number of cases for Washington." Washington 
Post, June 15, 1966, p. 22, col. I. 
106. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 
J. ClUM, L. C. &: P. S. 21, 44 (1961), reprinted in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
180 (Sowle ed. 1962). 
107. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. I, 64 (1964). 
108. Macinnes, The Criminal Society, in THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 101 (Rolph 
ed. 1962). 
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Moreover, with the inadvertent exception of those who wrote the 
interrogation manuals (each, I suspect, equal to a dozen law review 
articles in its impact on the Court),109 most law enforcement mem-
bers and their spokesmen did their best to keep society comfortable 
and blissfully ignorant. Not too surprisingly, they were much more 
interested in "sanitizing" the proceedings in the interrogation 
room than in disseminating the life-size details. As long ago as 1910 
(when, everybody now agrees, things were in a terrible state), the 
President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police as-
sured us: 
When the prisoner is taken into private quarters and there 
interrogated as to his goings and comings, or asked to explain what 
he may be doing with Mr. Brown's broken and dismantled jewelry 
in his possession, to take off a rubber-heeled shoe he may be wearing 
in order to compare it with a footprint in a burglarized premises, 
or even to explain the blood stains on his hands and clothing, that, 
hypothetically illustrates what would be called the "Third Degree." 
... If a confession, preceded by the customary caution, obtained 
through remorse or a desire to make reparation for a crime, is ad-
vanced by a prisoner, it surely should not be regarded as unfair .... 
Volunteer confessions and admissions made after a prisoner has 
been cautioned that what he states may be used against him, are 
all there is to the so-called "Third Degree." ... no 
109. The American Civil Liberties Union briefs amicus curiae in Escobedo and 
Miranda quote extensively from these manuals. Indeed, the Miranda brief reprints a 
full chapter from O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1959). In tum, 
the majority opinion in Miranda devotes six full pages, 384 U.S. at 449-54, to extracts 
from various police manuals and texts "which document procedures employed with 
success in the past, and which recommend various other effective tactics," id. at 448. 
Although such manuals had been available for many years, e.g., Kmn, PouCE IN-
TERROGATION (1940) and MULBAR, INTERROGATION (1951), SO far as I can tell neither 
law review articles nor Supreme Court briefs made much use of them until quite 
recently. As late as 1964 most of these manuals were not to be found in the libraries 
of at least two of our greatest law schools. Perhaps the first law review writer to make 
extensive use of these texts was Bernard Weisberg of the Chicago bar (see note 106 
supra), who later turned up as one of the ACLU lawyers in the Escobedo case. 
Two weeks after Miranda was handed down, Thomas C. Lynch, the Attorney 
General of California, in Washington for a meeting of the National Crime Commission 
of which he is a member, reported that a preliminary survey indicated "wide use" 
in his state of the police interrogation manuals criticized by the Court. He disclosed 
that he was considering a "purge" of all such manuals. Washington Post, June 30, 
1966, p. E2, col. 3. Professor Philip Zimbardo, who made the strong charge that "it 
is my professional opinion as a psychologist who has been concerned with the ex-
perimental modification of attitudes and behavior that these techniques [those illus-
trated in the manuals] represent a highly sophisticated application of psychological 
principles which for many people are more compelling and coercive than physical 
torture" (Zimbardo, "An Analysis of Pre-Arraignment Interrogation Techniques and 
Their Psychological Implications," p. 26, paper read at American Psychological Associa-
tion Meeting, Sept. 3, 1966), reported that he had "verified that these manuals are 
used in training interrogators by calling several police academies," id. at 10. 
110. Major Sylvester's comments are reported in Larson, Present Police and Legal 
Methods for the Determination of the Innocence or Guilt of the Suspect, 16 J. CRIM. 
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As recently as July of this year, the veteran special agent of the 
Kansas Bureau of Investigation, Alvin A Dewey, of In Cold Blood 
fame, told the Senate Sub-committee on Constitutional Amend-
ments: 
What is wrong with an officer exerosmg persistence and pa-
tience or showing confidence? Isn't that what any good salesman 
demonstrates in selling insurance or a car? And a law enforcement 
officer should be a good salesman in selling a suspect on telling the 
truth, proving his innocence or guilt. But a salesman cannot do 
his job if a competitor is standing by, and that is the situation for 
the law enforcement officer with the presence of an attorney while 
interrogating a suspect. 
As to the description of an interrogation room, I wish to define 
it as a room where people can talk in privacy which is nothing 
more than an attorney desires in talking to his client or a doctor in 
talking to his patient .... [These rooms] bear no resemblance to 
torture chambers as some may wish to think, and in fact some are 
equipped with air conditioning, carpeting, and upholstered furni-
ture.111 
What I have said so far does not fully account for the persis-
tence of the de facto inquisitorial system. In the late 1920's and 
early '30's, complacency about the system was shaken-at least for 
a while-by the notorious cases of Ziang Sun Wan v. United States112 
and People v. Doran113 and by the shocking disclosure of the Wick-
ersham Commission.114 Still the system survived. Why? Probably 
because, in addition to the factors I have already mentioned, the 
practice had become so widespread and intrenched by this time that 
even most of its critics despaired of completely uprooting it in 
the foreseeable future. A broad, fundamental attack on the system 
might well have failed completely; elimination of the more aggra-
vated forms of coercion commanded a high priority and alone ap-
peared feasible. In this regard, the pessimistic views of Zechariah 
Chafee, co-author of the famous report to the Wickersham Commis-
sion on "the third degree,"115 are instructive: 116 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 222·25 (1925) and reported in part in 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
316-17 (3d ed. 1940). 
111. Statement of Alvin A. Dewey before the Subcommitt<:e on Constitutional 
Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 21, 1966, p. 2 (mimeo.) 
(on file in the University of Michigan Law Library). 
112. 266 U.S. 1 (1924). See text at notes 188-89 infra. 
113. 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927). See text at notes 190-92 infra. 
114. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAW· 
LESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) (Wickersham Report). 
115. See note 85 supra. 
116. Chafee, Remedies for the Third Deg-ree, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1931, pp. 621, 
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Big jumps in policy may be unattainable or undesirable. [What 
would Chafee have said of Escobedo and Miranda?] Bad as the third 
degree is, we should be very cautious about disrupting the police 
department and the courts in the hope of abolishing it. 
Let us begin by considering two simple remedies which are free 
from the foregoing objections. 
The first is to shorten this danger period by obtaining the 
prompt production of the prisoner before a magistrate, after which 
he should be out of the hands of the police. This is the situation in 
Boston, and appears to contribute to the virtual nonexistence of 
the third degree in that city . . . . There is no opportunity for 
protracted interrogations lasting over several days and nights, which 
are common in cities where production in court is illegally delayed. 
Violence is less probable when scars will not have time to heal 
before the magistrate sees the prisoner next day. This remedy in-
volves no new law; practically all states require prompt produc-
tion in court. It introduces no startling innovation in police 
methods, but merely hastens an act which the police are accus-
tomed to perform. Of course, enforcement of this law will not al-
ways be an easy matter. The same motives which cause the police 
in many cities to investigate brutally also lead them to prolong the 
time of investigation illegally. However, excessive length of con-
finement is an offense which the judges can discover and correct 
more easily than secret coercion . . .. 
Secondly, official records should be kept of the exact time of ar-
rest and of detention; of the transfers of prisoners and the places 
to which they are taken; of interviews by the police with prisoners 
and the time interrogations begin and end; and (as in Boston) of 
injuries to prisoners found visible during a daily examination. Facts 
of this nature fit naturally into the records customarily kept in 
police stations and jails. 
The two remedies just recommended have the advantage of form-
ing a natural part of the existing routine of police stations and 
magistrates courts .... 
In England, the police are forbidden to interrogate a suspect 
after his arrest or involuntary detention; thus there is no danger of 
their using brutality or other pressure to obtain the desired an-
swers .... However, it is doubtful if this remedy could be success-
fully transferred to the United States, at least in the near future .... 
American police officials ... attach extreme importance to the 
questioning of arrested persons. They would consider the adoption 
of the English rule a serious crippling of their activities, and until 
they feel otherwise it would only be one more law which they would 
be tempted to violate. How could they be forced to obey it? It is 
hard enough to prevent policemen from using physical violence on 
suspects; it would be far harder to prevent them from asking a few 
625-26, 630. (Emphasis added.) See also Warner, How Can the Third Degree Be Elimi-
nated?, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 24 (1940), and the extract from it in note Ul infra. 
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questions. We had better get rid of the rubber hose and twenty-four 
hour grillings before we undertake to compel or persuade the police 
to give up questioning altogether. 
[The remedies recommended in this article] require no constitu-
tional amendments and no legislation, so that their adoption in-
volves no long delay. But immediate success must not be expected. 
The third degree is deeply rooted in official habits in many cities, 
and is not likely to disappear entirely until the officials have been 
persuaded that it is bad and unnecessary. 
IV. THE McNabb-Anderson BRIEFs: THE GovERNMENT AGREES 
THAT THE PRIVILEGE APPLIES TO PoLicE INTERROGATION, BuT ••• 
Until Miranda at least, very few of our states adopted the "sim-
ple" and relatively modest remedy of "shortening the danger period" 
by obtaining the prompt production of the prisoner before a magis-
trate.117 However, a dozen years after Professor Chafee wrote the 
aforementioned article the Supreme Court did resort to this remedy, 
as is well known, in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the 
administration of federal criminal justice.ll8 Neither the opinion 
of the Court nor the briefs of counsel contain citations to the 
Chafee article, but the McNabb opinion reads as if its author, Jus-
tice Frankfurter, had perused the writings of his former colleague 
more than once. 
One would never know it in the midst of all the beating of 
breasts and gnashing of teeth119 which greeted both McNabb and 
the Mallory case120 which reaffirmed it, but (as the Chafee article 
plainly indicates) the new federal rule marked a "compromise" be-
tween the objectionable existing practice and the "drastic proposals" 
then being advanced. That McNabb was a "compromise" became 
quite apparent121 in the wake of Escobedo, but it had not escaped 
117. In most instances, the courts have not even discussed whether in-custody 
investigation by the police is legal, concentrating instead on determining the 
point at which the police have gone too far in their interrogation practices so 
that the confessor should be regarded as coerc.ed. In the few cases where the issue 
of illegality has been pressed, most state courts have refused to follow the federal 
courts in excluding evidence obtained during periods of illegal delay and hence 
have not needed to mark out the boundaries of proper police conduct short of 
that extreme characterized as coercion. 
Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. 
REv. 11, 22 (1962). See also Schaefer, Comments [on Kamisar, Has the Court Left the 
Attorney Behind?, 54 KY. L.J. 464 (1966)], 54 KY. L.J. 521-22 (1966). 
118. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
119. See generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale 
and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958); Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1003 (1959). 
120. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
121. Shortly after Escobedo was decided, two former federal prosecutors proposed 
a combination of the McNabb-Mallory rule and objective recording of all question-
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the government lawyers who argued McNabb and the companion 
case of Anderson v. United States.122 Although they had urged the 
Court not to "hold inadmissible a confession made during the sub-
sistence of any unlawful practice regardless of whether the confes-
sion was voluntary,"123 the government lawyers devoted more space 
in their brief to "an even more extreme" possibility: 
We submit also that the Court should not adopt an even more 
extreme rule requiring the exclusion of confessions obtained during 
cross-examination of persons in the custody of the police. The shock-
ing conditions revealed by appellate court decisions and by the re-
searches of investigators naturally give rise to the suggestion that 
the evils must be ended by abolishing the system of police examina-
tion which lies at the root of the evils. The ability to use as evidence 
confessions obtained by cross-examination is said to lead a lax 
police force to rely upon confessions and not upon sound investi-
gatory techniques in tracing clues and uncovering evidence. Simi-
larly it is suggested that proper interrogation too easily becomes 
bullying and bullying becomes brutality. The evil effects of the 
resulting "third degree" upon the whole system of law observance 
and law enforcement can scarcely be exaggerated. Finally, propo-
nents of this view point to the low rate of crime and high rate of 
crime detection in Great Britain where, apparently, the police are 
not permitted to interrogate a prisoner except to clarify a volun-
teered statement.l24 
Some of the reasons advanced by the government to stay the 
Court's hand in McNabb and Anderson sound very much like the 
reasons urged by the federal and state governments a quarter-cen-
tury later in Miranda:l21S 
If a remedy is needed in addition to ex1stmg sanctions, the 
remedy should be administrative or legislative but not judicial. 
Two reasons support this conclusion. First, the courts are ill equipped 
to make the investigation necessary before the settled principles 
may be overturned. Second, the courts have no discretion in the 
choice of a remedy. The administrative officials may prescribe and 
enforce regulations designed to protect prisoners against the "third 
ing at places controlled by the police as a "more workable and less drastic means" 
of controlling interrogation abuses than the presence of counsel at these sessions. 
Enker &: Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 85 (1964). 
122. 318 U.S. 350 (1943). Although today McNabb is the much more famous case, 
the government used its brief in Anderson as the vehicle for extended treatment of 
the problem. 
123. Brief for United States, pp. 49-50. 
124. Id. at 52-53. 
125. Cf. Brief for the State of New York and Twenty-Six other States as Amici 
Curiae, in "Miranda Cases," pp. 23, 35-38; Brief for United States, p. 45, Westover v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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degree." If the legislative branch determined to forbid interroga-
tion by the police and to exclude extrajudicial confessions thus ob-
tained from evidence, it might meet the demands of law enforce-
ment by providing a substitute such as an immediate examination 
by the prosecuting attorney in the presence of the counsel for the 
accused, or perhaps some system of quasi-judicial examination ac-
companied by a limitation, by constitutional amendment where 
necessary, of the privilege against self-incrimination.126 
How an "immediate examination by the prosecuting attorney in 
the presence of the counsel for the accused" could possibly "meet 
the demands of law enforcement"-as law enforcement conceived 
those demands-is not made clear. Nor why a quasi-judicial exam-
ination of the accused might require a modification of the priv-
ilege although nonjudicial examination did not. For, and this is 
perhaps the most extraordinary feature of this extraordinary brief, 
the government agreed that the privilege against self-incrimination 
controlled the admissibility of confessions (as I read the brief, with 
some blinking, in state as well as federal cases), although, for one 
thing, it had to "sanitize" police interrogation in order to meet this 
standard: 
[T]he guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination and 
of due process of law are limitations put upon the state in protec-
tion of the individual against invasions of "his indefeasible right" 
of personal security, personal liberty, and the privacies of life, where 
the right has not been forfeited by a conviction for crime. See 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630. But the constitutional pro-
hibition is not laid upon only the most obnoxious practices. Even 
a restrained secret interrogation may gradually turn to mental or 
physical torture .... Therefore, the accused is given the privilege, 
which he may choose to exercise or not as he pleases, to check the 
danger at the outset by refusing to answer any incriminating ques-
tions; if he refuses, the state must not use "physical or moral com-
pulsion to extort communications from him." 
The Constitution grants this privilege specifically by the pro-
vision in the Fifth Amendment that no man "shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and it grants 
the privilege impliedly in the due process clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
An accused person feels compulsion to speak, at the outset, in 
the hope of establishing his innocence and, at the end, when that is 
gone, in the weight of his conscience, or in the hope of obtaining 
leniency. But in such a case, the state cannot be said to have coerced 
126 . .Brief for United States, pp. 55-56, Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 
(1943). 
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the answers. The state has not invaded any right of personal security 
or privacy against the will of the accused, or exerted moral or 
physical compulsion to extort the communication. Such a confes-
sion, therefore, is admissible. 
[A] confession made in answer to interrogation by the police 
may be admitted in evidence without infringement of any consti-
tutional right, provided that the accused is left free to end the 
examination into his guilt or innocence by a refusal to answer, and 
provided that his will is respected and not subjugated to the will 
of his accusers.127 
If there has ever been an alleged "coerced confession" case 
worth litigating where the defendant was given either the privilege 
against self-incrimination to exercise "as he pleases" or the freedom 
to "end the examination" by a simple refusal to answer, I am un-
aware of it. At any rate, not until Miranda did the Court strive to 
check "the danger [of secret interrogation] at the outset" by re-
quiring that the suspect be fully and fairly advised that he has a 
"right of silence" which he may "choose to exercise ... as he 
pleases." This, as I understand it, is what much of the shouting is 
about. Not until Miranda did the Court make plain that even 
though the suspect may have answered some questions or volun-
teered some statements he is "free to end the examination" by in-
dicating that he does not wish to be interrogated further. Again, 
this, I take it, is what much of the shouting is about. 
It is no mean feat to put beyond the reach of the privilege those 
proceedings in which a man is being "compelled"-in almost pris-
tine form-to testify against himself. But it takes real dexterity to 
do what the government did in McNabb and Anderson, i.e., pur-
port to apply the privilege to a phase of the criminal process which 
had grown up more or less accidentally and extralegally, yet con-
clude that this application of the constitutional provision does not 
change things very much. In order to accomplish such an extraor-
dinary feat, the Government not only had to tidy up the facts to 
suit the standard, but also had to loosen the standard to suit the 
facts. As the Government perceived the matter, the privilege against 
self-incrimination turned out to be little, if anything, more than 
the "voluntary" test masquerading under a different label. Whether 
the route taken in arriving at this result be viewed as augmenting 
the common law and due process standards a bit or as diluting the 
force of the privilege (at least as it had been construed in more 
127. Id. at 39-40, 46, 48. (Emphasis added.) 
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formal settings) a good deal, all the tests, even the one based on 
"trustworthiness" wound up in a single ball of wax: 
It is familiar and settled law that a "voluntary" confession 
should be admitted into evidence, and that a "coerced" confession 
should be excluded. Whatever the logic of the criticisms, this test 
is applicable whether the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, or the law of evidence be invoked as ground for the 
objection. 
The privilege is not to be "compelled" to give evidence against 
oneself. And in the leading cases setting aside convictions based 
upon confessions because due process was denied, the Court care-
fully pointed out that "the undisputed facts showed that compul-
sion was applied." Chambers v. Florida ... Coercion and com-
pulsion exist in this sense when the accused is deprived "of his free 
choice, to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer," when his will is 
broken so that he will make whatever statement his inquisitors may 
desire .... A confession obtained from a Chinese suffering physical 
pain who was held incommunicado and questioned for seven days 
and all of one night is obtained by compulsion. Wan v. United 
States, 266 U.S. 1. [Is this example supposed to illuminate the 
meaning of "compelled" to be a witness against oneself?] 
Comparison of the constitutional requirement with the criterion 
of testimonial worth shows that they are essentially the same both 
in abstract statement and in practical application. Both are sum-
marized in the words "voluntary" and "compulsion" .... In theory, 
it may be that a man is less ready to accuse himself falsely than 
he is to surrender his will to remain silent, but it is doubtful that 
so fine a line can be drawn in practice. The two aims, to admit 
true confessions and to abolish abuses, are overlapping; the ultimate 
test in each case is whether the confession is what the accused was 
willing to say or what the accusers wished him to tell them.128 
As the government's approach in McNabb and Anderson well 
illustrates, excluding the privilege from the interrogation room is 
not the only way to reconcile the proceedings inside with the fifth 
amendment. One may also let the privilege in, but "balance" it. 
"Outside" the interrogation room, unlike first amendment rights 
whose assertion "to bar governmental interrogation ... always in-
volves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public 
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown,"129 "a 
proper claim of the privilege against self-incrimination . . . af-
128. Id. at 28, 41-42, 48-49. 
129. Barenb1att v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (Harlan, J.). 
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ford[s] a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances."130 
"Outside," the most pressing demands of national security cannot 
override the privilege; "inside," evidently, routine law enforcement 
needs may, and often should, prevail. That, at least, is how I view 
the government's plea of a quarter-century ago to maintain the 
status quo, to stick with the old "voluntariness" test (alias the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination): 
If all extra judicial confessions were excluded from evidence, 
there would be less aggression against these liberties because the in-
centive would be largely removed. On the other hand, it is essential 
that crime be detected and important that all data having testi-
monial worth be used to establish the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. Thus, there is a conflict between the demands of individual 
liberty and the public interest in efficient law enforcement. The 
test of voluntariness seems to us to resolve this conflict at the line 
marked by the Constitution. It should not, we submit, be modified 
by the courts to be more stringent.131 
As late as 1966, the dissenters in Miranda seemed to agree. 
V. THE "VoLUNTARINEss" TEST: "A WoRKABLE AND EFFECTIVE 
MEANS OF DEALING WITH CoNFESSIONS IN A J umciAL MANNER" 
Although Justice Clark would modify the old test,132 he looks 
back on it as one "which we are accustomed to administering and 
130. Ibid. 
131. Brief for United States, op. cit. supra note 126, at 38. 
A short time earlier, Sam Bass Warner, principal draftsman of the Uniform Arrest 
Act, who was said to be one of the few professors who had "accompanied the police 
on their tours of duty in order to learn and report the true facts," Wilson, Police 
Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, in POLICE PowER AND 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 21, 26 (Sowle ed. 1962), had articulated "the conflict" and the 
need to strike "a proper balance" much more crisply: 
The difficulties confronting a defendant who desires to reserve his story until 
trial are well-known. When he is arrested, the police will endeavor to make him 
"come across." Whether they will violate the Fifth Amendment by compelling 
him to be a witness against himself, depends upon what is meant by "com-
pelling." If the term "compel" includes a two or three hour examination during 
which several police officers urge him to confess and do their best to confuse 
and entrap him into a confession, then the Fifth Amendment is violated in 
every city in the United States. 
If in their effort to break down the suspect, our police stopped after giving 
him a severe grilling for a few hours, we might believe that the Fifth Amend-
ment was being violated and regret that the liberty of the individual was not 
better respected, but we should have no serious ground for complaint. In fact, 
it may well be that a proper balance between the individual interest in freedom 
from compulsory self-mcrimination and the social interest in the discovery of 
crime requires that suspects be subjected to such a cross-examination. The situa-
tion becomes serious only when the police go further and indulge in what is 
popularly known as the "third degree." 
Warner, supra note 116, at 25. See also notes 141-43 infra and accompanying text. 
132. See notes 4 and 11 supra. 
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which we know from our cases are effective instruments in pro-
tecting persons in police custody."133 For Justice Harlan, the pre-
Escobedo-Miranda cases "show that there exists a workable and 
effective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial manner"134 
and that "the court has developed an elaborate, sophisticated, and 
sensitive approach to admissibility," one "ever more familiar to the 
lower courts."135 
Justice Clark's enthusiasm for the pre-Escobedo test was not 
always so abundant. Only five years earlier he had referred to "the 
elusive, measureless standard of psychological coercion heretofore 
developed in this Court by accretion on almost an ad hoc, case-by-
case basis."136 And long before that (in a search and seizure setting) 
he had scored the "uncertainty" and "unpredictability" generated 
by "a case by case approach to due process in which inchoate no-
tions of propriety concerning local police conduct guide our deci-
sions," maintaining that by such an approach "we do not shape the 
conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on dis-
similar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of those police 
and prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage 
of successful prosecutions."137 As for Justice Harlan, in stressing 
that the late, lamented test gave "ample recognition to society's in-
terest in suspect questioning as an instrument of law enforce-
ment,"138 he succeeded, it seems to me, in violently shaking the 
aforementioned assurance by Justice Clark that the pre-Escobedo-
Miranda test was "an effective instrument in protecting persons in 
police custody": 
Cases countenancing quite significant pressures can be cited 
without difficulty, and the lower courts may often have been yet 
more tolerant.1a9 
133. 384 U.S. at 503. 
134. Id. at 506. 
135. Id. at 508. 
U6. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 455 (1961) (dissenting opinion). 
137. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring). 
138. 384 U.S. at 509. 
139. Ibid., referring to the cases synopsized in Herman, The Supreme Court and 
Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 456 &: nn.36-39 (1964). See 
also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 524 (1963) (Clark, J., joined by Harlan, 
Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting): 
[Not] even the fact that one is "held incommunicado, is subjected to questioning 
by officers for long periods, and deprived of the advice of counsel," without a 
showing that he had "so lost his freedom of action" that the confession was not 
his own, requires a reversal under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia [314 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1941)]. Finally, the fact that police officers violated 
state statutes in their treatment of the petitioner does "not furnish an answer" 
to the question whether a confession was voluntarily made. Id. at 235; &ee 
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). 
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One not too distant example is Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 
181 [1952], in which the suspect was kicked and threatened after his 
arrest, questioned a little later for two hours, and isolated from a 
lawyer trying to see him; the resulting confession was held admis-
sible.uo 
The Miranda majority contended that "the absurdity" of deny-
ing that a confession obtained under typical "interrogation room" 
circumstances "is compelled" is "aptly portrayed" by Professor 
Arthur Sutherland's hypothetical of a well-to-do testatrix who is 
"captured" by the would-be heirs who "put her in a carefully de-
signed room, out of touch with everyone but themselves . . . [and] 
ke.ep her secluded there for hours while they make insistent de-
m_ands, weary her with contradictions of her assertions that she 
wants to leave her money to [someone else], and finally induce her 
to execute the will in their favor." 141 
Justice Harlan's retort was that the need of law enforcement 
"is, of course, what makes so misleading the Court's comparison 
of a probate judge readily setting aside as involuntary the will of 
an old lady badgered and beleagured by the new heirs."142 However, 
after posing his hypothetical, Professor Sutherland had commented: 
At once one will hear the response that the testatrix is not a 
criminal; that obtaining a surrender of rights from a criminal is 
different; that the interest of the state demands that criminals be 
not coddled. That is to say we are told that a man with his life at 
stake should be able to surrender an ancient constitutional right 
to remain silent, under compulsions which in a surrender of a little 
property would obviously make the transaction void.143 
This is precisely what Justice Harlan seems to be telling us. 
The view that the "voluntariness test" effectively protected sus-
pects seems questionable, in large part because Justice Harlan's 
sanguine attitude about the "workability" of the "voluntariness" 
test and the test's growing familiarity to the lower courts seems un-
warranted. His attitude hardly finds support in his own recognition 
that the Court "never pinned [the "voluntariness rubric"] ... down 
140. 384 U.S. at 509 n.5. As Justice Harlan recognizes elsewhere, see text at note 
145 infra, in the evolution of the "totality of circumstances" test the use of physical 
violence in obtaining a confession emerged as a per se ground for inadmissibility, 
but "causation" questions remained. Stroble, sentenced to death for first degree 
murder, did not prevail in the Supreme Court because circumstances indicated that 
he had confessed "quite independently of any duress by the police." 343 U.S. at 191 
(Clark, J.). 
141. 384 U.S. at 457-58 n.26, quoting from Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 
HARV. L. REv. 21, 37 (1965). 
142. 384 U.S. at 516 &: n.l!l. Compare note 1!11 supra. 
143. Sutherland, supra note 141, at 37. 
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to a single meaning, but on the contrary infused it with a number 
of different values"144 or in his acknowledgment that "apart from 
direct physical coercion ... no single default or fixed combination 
of them guaranteed exclusion and synopses of the cases would serve 
little use because the overall gauge has been steadily changing, 
usually in the direction of restricting admissibility."145 Nor does 
the touted workability, effectiveness, sophistication and sensitivity 
of the old test find support in the Bator-Vorenberg article (which 
Justice Harlan quotes with approval): 
In fact, the concept of involuntariness seems to be used by the 
courts as a shorthand to refer to practices which are repellent to 
civilized standards of decency or which, under the circumstances, 
are thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual which 
unfairly impairs his capacity to make a rational choice.146 
Nor can the defenders of the old test gain much comfort from the 
paragraph (which the dissenting Justices do not quote) immediately 
preceding the one quoted above: 
Judicial decisions speak in terms of the "voluntariness" of a 
confession, but the term itself provides little guidance. To the 
extent "voluntariness" has made a determination of the state of 
an individual's will the crucial question, it has not assisted analysis. 
Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks 
capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements--even 
those made under brutal treatment are "voluntary" in the sense of 
representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if "volun-
tariness" incorporates notions of "but-for" cause, the question 
should be whether the statement would have been made even ab-
sent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtually no 
statement would be voluntary because very few people give in-
criminating statements in the absence of official action of some 
kind.147 
144. 384 U.S. at 507. 
145. Id. at 508. 
146. Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel, 
66 CoLUM. L. REv. 62, 73 (1966), quoted with approval, 384 U.S. at 507 n.4; cf. Kamisar, 
What Is An "Involuntary" Confession?, 17 RuTGERS L. REv. 728, 745-46 (1963): 
There is much talk in Culombe [v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)] of "in-
voluntariness" and the "suction process;" of "draining" the "capacity for freedom 
of choice"; of "overreaching," "overbearing" or "breaking" the "will." But are 
these words and phrases any more illuminating than say, the talk of yesteryear 
about "affected with a public interest," "subject to the exercise of the police 
power," or "devoted to the public use?" Is "involuntariness" or "coercion" or 
"breaking the will" (or its synonyms) little more than a fiction intended to vilify 
certain "effective" interrogation methods? Is "voluntariness" or "mental freedom" 
or "self-determination" (or its equivalents) little more than a fiction designed to 
beautify certain other interrogation techniques? 
147. Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 146, at 72-711. 
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Justice Harlan did not pause to document his assertion that the 
pre-Escobedo approach to the admissibility of confessions-which 
was undergoing "a continuing re-evaluation on the facts of each 
case of how much pressure on the subject was permissible"148-was 
growing "ever more familiar to the lower courts." Similarly, al-
though Professors Bator and Vorenberg talk about "the courts" 
using the voluntary-involuntary terminology as a "shorthand," they 
do not cite a 'single lower court case-only a host of United States 
Supreme Court cases and one secondary authority whose complaint, 
inter alia, is that by continuing to define the "voluntariness" re-
quired by due process in terms of the old threadbare generalities 
and empty abstractions (e.g., "made ... freely and voluntarily and 
without fear of punishment or hope of reward") and by failing to 
advise juries of specific types of police misconduct relevant to the 
issue, the state trial courts were permitting the term to continue 
to be used in its ordinary, everyday (and unhelpful) sense.149 In-
deed, in Haynes v. Washington,150 which marks the "end of the 
line" for the old test, the jury was instructed, in effect, to preclude 
from its consideration of the "voluntariness" issue that the accused 
was not reminded he was under arrest, was not cautioned he could 
remain silent, nor warned that his answers could be used against 
him, nor advised of his right to counsel.151 True, although not re-
lied on as a separate ground of reversal, these instructions were 
regarded by the 5-4 Haynes majority as raising "a serious and 
substantial question whether a proper constitutional standard was 
applied by the jury."152 There seems to be a significant difference, 
however, between forbidding a trial court from precluding con-
sideration of these factors and requiring the court to instruct af-
firmatively that they must be taken into account. 
The most ambitious attempt to bring order, coherence and 
clarity to the "involuntary" or "coerced" confession field, the most 
148. 384 U.S. at 507. (Emphasis in the original.) 
149. See Kamisar, supra note 146, at 752-53. 
Actually, as Professors Bator and Vorenberg point out in the opening footnote, 
since their article is "an informal working paper, designed to be used as a basis for 
discussion," it "contains no documentation of any sort." However, the authors are 
the principal draftsmen of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure, and, understandably, the commentary to the proposed code, written at 
about the same time as the article, follows it closely. The passage quoted by Justice 
Harlan appears verbatim in the commentary, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRo-
CEDURE 167 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1966), and when I refer to Professors Bator and Voren-
berg's documentation for this passage I mean that which is contained in the com-
mentary to the code. 
150. 373 u.s. 503 (1963). 
151. ld. at 518. 
152. Ibid. 
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arduous effort to develop "a set of principles [in terms of the old 
test] which cvuld be easily applied in any coerced-confession situa-
tion,"153 was the late Justice Frankfurter's sixty-seven page "trea-
tise"154 in Culombe v. Connecticut.155 What was the result of these 
Herculean labors? Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and 
Whittaker, "agreed to what my Brother Frankfurter has written 
in delineation of the general principles governing police interro-
gation ... and as to the factors which should guide federal judicial 
review of state action in this field"156-but reached the opposite 
result.157 Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, took a different 
route than did Justice Frankfurter, but reached the same result.158 
The Chief Justice, in the course of joining the separate concurring 
opinion of Justice Brennan, would only say of the general prin-
ciples enunciated by Justice Frankfurter: "On an abstract level, 
I find myself in agreement with some portions of the opinion and 
in disagreement with other portions."159 Only one member of the 
Court, Justice Stewart, joined in Justice Frankfurter's dissertation. 
Two years after Culombe and only a year before Escobedo, the 
Court split 5-4 in Haynes. 160 Justice Clark, joined by Harlan, Stew-
art and White, JJ., regarded "the Court's reversal ... [as] an abrupt 
departure from the rule laid down in the cases of this Court and 
an enlargement of the requirements heretofore visited upon state 
courts in confession cases."161 For the majority's determination that 
the Haynes confession was "involuntary" the four dissenters could 
"find no support in any of the thirty-three cases decided on the 
question by this Court."162 Does this sound like the Supreme Court, 
let alone the lower courts, had grown "accustomed to adminis-
tering" the "voluntariness" test? 
For me, the strongest evidence of the ineffectiveness and un-
workability of the old test was yet to come. It came one week after 
the Miranda case, when, having declined to give retroactive effect 
153. So described by the Chief Justice in his concurring opinion, 367 U.S. at 636. 
154. Again so described by the Chief Justice, 367 U.S. at 636. The Miranda dis· 
senters were gracious enough not to elaborate on the Chief Justice's preference in 
Culombe for developing "the law on a case-by-case approach," declaring "legal prin-
ciples only in the context of specific factual situations," and avoiding "expounding 
more than is necessary for the decision of a given case." Ibid. 
155. 367 u.s. 568 (1961). 
156. ld. at 642 (dissenting opinion). 
157. Ibid. 
158. ld. at 637-41. 
159. ld. at 636. 
160. 373 u.s. 503 (1963). 
161. Id. at 521. 
162. Id. at 525. 
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to Escobedo and Miranda, 163 the Court applied the old test (on col-
lateral attack) in Davis v. North Carolina.164 
As indicated earlier, 165 in challenging the admissibility of his 
confessions,,Elmer Davis, Jr., was more fortunate than most in his 
predicament. He could point to a specific notation on the arrest 
sheet: "Do not allow anyone to see Davis. Or allow him to use the 
telephone." 166 As Chief Judge Sobeloff pointed out, "rarely do police 
officials make a written declaration, as they did here, of a design to 
deny their prisoner's right to counsel and his other constitutional 
rights."167 Davis could also point to the uncontested fact that no 
one other than the police had spoken to him during the sixteen 
days of detention and interrogation that preceded his confessions. 
The Supreme Court had "never sustained the use of a confession 
obtained after such a lengthy period of detention and interrogation 
as was involved in this case."168 However, this did not suffice in the 
Superior and Supreme Courts of North Carolina in the year 1960.169 
Nor did it impress the federal district court, which first denied him 
163. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
johnson recalls Judge Qua's observation a decade ago: "Practical considerations 
may impinge heavily and divert the development of theory from its straight logical 
course. We all know this occurs from time to time in our own courts and sometimes 
to the gTeat advantage of the law and the community. Similar forces operate in 
Washington." Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 143, 147 (1957). Although 
"the advantages" to "the community" of declining to apply Escobedo and Miranda 
retroactively are considerable, I think johnson was wrongly decided, for reasons sug-
gested by a series of leading questions in HALL & KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCE· 
DURE 503 (2d ed. 1966). How can the Court say that "while Escobedo and Miranda 
provide important new safeguards against the use of unreliable statements at trial, 
the nonretroactivity of these decisions will not preclude persons whose trials have 
already been completed from invoking the same safeguards as part of an involun-
tariness claim"? 384 U.S. at 730. (Emphasis added.) If, as seems plain, Escobedo and 
Miranda indicate dissatisfaction with-and lack of confidence in-the actual opera-
tion of the old "voluntariness" and "totality of circumstances" tests, just as Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) manifests dissatisfaction with and lack of confi-
dence in the old Betts "prejudice" and "special circumstances" standards, how can 
it be sufficient that "our law on coerced confessions is available for persons whose 
trials have already been completed"? 384 U.S. at 730. 
I hasten to add, however, that here again, compare note 8 supra, the Court was 
faced with a "damned if it did and damned if it didn't" issue. If the Court had 
given the new confession rulings retroactive effect, I venture to say the roar of 
disapproval would have been deafening. Not only would many law enforcement 
officers have proclaimed "chaos" and "catastrophe," but not a few law professors would 
have chided the Court for "pretending the Constitution is now what it always was" 
and for "inhibiting judicial creativity." 
164. 384 u.s. 737 (1966). 
165. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text. 
166. 384 U.S. at 744. 
167. 339 F.2d 770, 780 (4th Cir. 1964). Judge Bell joined in Chief Judge Sobeloff's 
dissenting opinion. 
168. 384 U.S. at 752. 
169. 253 N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960). 
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an evidentiary hearing,170 and then, when reversed on this point,171 
found his confessions to have been "voluntary."172 Nor, in the year 
1964, was it quite enough for the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, which upheld denial of the writ by a 3-2 
vote.173 
The readiness with which the state and lower federal courts 
passing on the admissibility of Davis' confessions accepted dubious 
police claims, and the looseness with which they stated (or, more 
accurately, failed to state) "the facts," is hardly calculated to inspire 
confidence in the workability and effectiveness of the test-from 
the defendant's point of view, at any rate. In affirming Davis' con-
viction, a unanimous Supreme Court of North Carolina observed: 
[T]he prisoner was advised he need not make a statement; that 
if he did it might be used against him. 
The prisoner asked to see his sister, whom the officers searched 
for, after some difficulty found, and delivered the prisoner's mes-
sage. She appeared at the jail and Captain McCall admitted her to 
a private conference with the prisoner.174 
The prisoner's sister was admitted to a private conference with 
him, but, the state court neglected to point out, not until he 
had already confessed after having been interrogated "forty-five 
minutes or an hour or maybe a little more" each day for sixteen 
days.175 Similarly, the state court failed to note that there was no 
indication in the record that the prisoner was advised of his rights 
until the sixteenth day-after he had confessed orally but before he 
had signed the written confession.176 
After holding a habeas corpus hearing, the federal district court 
had little difficulty concluding "from the totality of circumstances 
in this case that the confession was the product of a rational in-
tellect and a free will."177 How did it deal with the tell-tale nota-
tion on the police blotter directing that Davis be held incommuni-
cado? It made no reference whatever to this incongruous item in its 
five page opinion, four of which are devoted to the "historical facts." 
Moreover, although the head of the detective division admitted 
170. 196 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961). 
171. 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962). 
172. 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1963). 
173. 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964). 
174. 253 N.C. 86, 94, 96, ll6 S.E.2d 365, 370, 371 (1960). 
175. See 384 U.S. at 745-47; 339 F.2d at 783 (dissenting opinion). 
176. See id. at 739; 339 F.2d at 782 (dissenting opinion). 
177. 221 F. Supp. 494, 499 (E.D.N.C. 1963). 
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that Charlotte police sought and received permission from the war-
den of the state prison to keep Davis "temporarily" in their cus-
tody, primarily for the reason that they suspected him of the rape-
murder to which he later confessed,178 they managed to convince 
the federal district court that, for the first twelve of the sixteen days 
he was their prisoner, they had refrained from asking Davis any 
questions about the murder, but rather confined their questions 
to thefts and unlawful entries committed by him after his escape.179 
"The notation on the arrest record creates suspicions," conceded 
the 3-2 majority of the Fourth Circuit, "but such suspicions can-
not overcome the positive evidence that the notation had no prac-
tical effect or influence upon what was done and that help rather 
than hindrance was offered to [Davis] in his one effort to contact 
someone outside the prison walls."180 This is the police version. 
The Fourth Circuit opinion pointed out elsewhere that Davis' 
sister had testified at the habeas corpus hearing that "she twice 
went to see her brother in the Charlotte City Jail, but each time 
was turned away."181 The district court, however, "did not believe 
her, finding, as the officers testified, that neither she nor anyone 
else was turned away ... ,''182 
What, if anything, one might ask, does the foregoing discussion 
prove? The United States Supreme Court reversed (Clark and Har-
lan, JJ., dissenting), did it not? Yes, indeed, but it should never be 
forgotten that in the thirty years since Brown v. Mississippi, 183 the 
Supreme Court has taken an average of about one state confession 
case per year.184 How fared the many defendants all these years who, 
in the midst of the confusion and conflict so characteristic of "fac-
tual litigation" in this area, could not fall back on extraordinarily 
helpful "objective facts," as could Davis? How fared the many de-
fendants whose cases did not receive the meticulous attention each 
Justice gives "death penalty" cases marked in red,m as was Davis' 
case and two-thirds of the confession cases the Court has chosen 
to review these past thirty years? 
178. See 384 U.S. at 743 n.3; 339 F.2d at 779, 784 (dissenting opinion). 
179. 221 F. Supp. at 496. "Not humanly possible," asserted the dissenting judges 
in the Fourth Circuit, 339 F.2d at 784. 
180. 339 F.2d at 775 (Haynsworth, J.). 
181. Ibid. 
182. 221 F. Supp. at 496. 
183. 297 u.s. 278 (1936). 
184. Including Brown, the Court decided thirty-five state confession cases from 
1936 through 1965. See National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Defender 
Newsletter, Vol. II, no. 5, Sept. 1965. 
185. See PRETTYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 305 (1961). 
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Analyzing a recent Supreme Court Term, a careful student of 
that institution's work reported that the Court was asked to review 
over 2,000 cases, of which forty-two involved the death penalty. 
Although "all of the allegations in these capital cases were so serious 
that the Supreme Court might have felt compelled to decide each 
and every one of them" only one condemned man out of four re-
ceived a hearing, and only one out of eight obtained a reversal.186 
How many garden-variety c:dminal defendants who cried "coerced 
confession" but lost the "swearing contest" below were likely to sur-
vive the winnowing process above? As Justice Black put it in the 
Miranda oral arguments, "if you are going to determine it [the ad-
missibility of the confession] each time on the circumstances ... 
[if] this Court will take them one by one ... it is more than we are 
capable of doing."lS7 
Immediately prior to Escobedo and Miranda, could we afford to 
be proud of the progress we had made since the 1924 Ziang Sun 
Wan case? On that occasion two lower federal courts upheld a con-
fession obtained from a seriously ill Chinese who had been held 
incommunicado for over a week, most of the time in a secluded 
hotel room where he was questioned "morning, afternoon and eve-
ning (and at least on one occasion after midnight)."188 (The Govern-
ment met a much cooler reception in the Supreme Court than it 
had enjoyed in the lower courts when it depicted the case as 
one in which the defendant "had voluntarily acquiesced in going to 
the hotel; he had never complained of the presence of officers there 
with him ... he had been in a good humor all the time about the 
matter.")189 
Had we made forty years worth of progress since the 1927 Doran 
case where, despite a powerful dissent by Judge Lehman, joined by 
Chief Judge Cardozo, what was probably the finest state court in 
the land affirmed a murder conviction based on a confession elicited 
from a man who had admittedly fainted during the "questioning," 
who had needed to be revived with whiskey and who admittedly 
had been "talked to" by an officer wearing a boxing glove on his 
hand?190 (A majority of the New York Court of Appeals, per Crane, 
J., had speculated that "realization of the horrible deed which had 
186. ld. at 297-98. 
187. Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument in Miranda and Companion Cases, 
p. 91 (oral argument of Mr. Earle for petitioner in Vignera v. New York), on file in 
University of Michigan Law Library. 
188. 266 u.s. 1, ll (1924). 
189. Brief for the United States, p. 43. 
190. 246 N.Y. 409, 422-23, 159 N.E. 379, 384 (1927). 
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been committed and that at last he had been discovered" might 
have caused the defendant to faint. 191 As for the boxing glove, 
the majority conceded "this surely was a foolish thing for [the 
officer] to do, but it was to be considered by the jury with all the 
other testimony in determining the truth or falsity of Doran's state-
ment about the use of violence.")192 
True, this was a long time ago, but the lower federal courts in 
Ziang Sun Wan and the state courts in Doran utilized a "volun-
tariness" test not much different from the one still being employed 
at least by the lower courts in the 1960's.193 Could we confidently 
assert that confessions obtained on Wan and Doran type facts would 
never have passed muster in the lower courts in the '60's? 
A short week after they paid their respects to the late "volun-
tariness" test, Justices Clark and Harlan would have applied it to 
sustain Davis' confessions. The Court's reversal, they protested, 
"goes against the grain of our prior decisions." 194 "[T]he sporadic 
interrogation of Davis," as they saw it, "can hardly be denominated 
as sustained or overbearing pressure. From the record it appears 
that he was simply questioned for about an hour each day [for six-
teen days] by a couple of detectives. There was no protracted 
grilling. Nor did the police operate in relays."195 
"Disagreement," said Justice Harlan of the "voluntariness" 
test, "is usually confined to that borderland of close cases where 
it matters least."196 After three decades and thirty-odd "coerced" 
confession cases which saw "the overall gauge ... steadily changing, 
usually in the direction of restricting admissibility,"197 was Davis 
still a "close case"? If so, was the need to scrap the "voluntariness" 
test still a close question? 
191. Id. at 422. 
192. !d. at 423. 
193. Since the Wan jury was told that "in determining whether or not said con-
fessions or admissions were voluntary" it "may take into consideration" that "the 
defendant was not warned that the confessions would or might be used against him 
or that he was not obliged to make any incriminating statement," that "the police 
repeatedly questioned him and importuned him to talk about the case" and other 
specific factors (Brief for the United States, p. 51), these instructions seem superior 
to those given in Haynes, some forty years later. See discussion in text at notes 
149-51 supra. I am aware that Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) required the 
trial court to actually determine the issue of "coercion" or "voluntariness" himself, 
at least in the first instance, but presumably how a judge instructs a jury on an 
issue is some evidence of how he himself would go about resolving that issue. 
194. 384 U.S. at 753. 
195. !d. at 754-55. 
196. 384 U.S. at 509. 
197. !d. at 508. 
